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The intelligence function comprises the gathering, evaluation and
dissemination of information relevant to decision-making, and may
include prediction based on such information, as well as planning for
future contingencies. In short, intelligence involves the acquisition of
information and planning in exercise of all five of the intellectual tasks
required of decisionmakers.1 The relation between the intelligence
function and community goals is particularly subtle: although intelli-
gence operates within the frame of authorized goals, one duty of ef-
fective intelligence is to appraise these goals in the context of knowledge
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1. A number of political scientists have become increasingly concerned with
complex organizations as circuits for the delivery of information. For a prominent
example, see K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GoVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL (1966). To an even greater degree, general systems
analysis is concerned with the organization and delivery of information. See, e.g.,
D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965). On intelligence in
complex organizations, see H. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWL-
EDGE AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967). While our work draws
on many of the insights of these approaches, our thrust is fundamentally different.
We are concerned with authoritative decision; our interest in intelligence derives
from the dependence of rational decision on knowledge. Our task is to identify
the optimum procedures for gathering, processing and disseminating intelligence for
constitutive and public order decision; to note divergences from optimum procedures
and constellations of conditions that account for such divergences; and to propose
alternatives. The configurative focus on decision subjects intelligence objectives
to constitutive decision goals. Some relevant perspectives are sketched in Mayo &
Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and The Predictive
Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318 (1964).
(365)
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and, where appropriate, to bring new attention areas, for the purposes
of goal clarification, to the focus of decisionmakers.
Intelligence is a critical function at all levels of decision-making,
yet its very ubiquity seems to have obscured it from visibility to
scholarly inquiry. There is no dearth of historical examples demon-
strating the critical importance of reliable intelligence. Kautilya em-
phasized to would-be leaders the strategic advantage of knowing the
enemy's plans,2 Joshua used it wisely, if somewhat dogmatically, and
Napoleon put the theory to use with devastating effect. Both Stalin
and Hitler, in our own day, have shown that the utility of the most
accurate and timely intelligence depends upon a decisionmaker capable
and willing to use it.3
For the individual human being, rational and realistic behavior is
an interaction between explicit or implicit goals and a constant flow of
information about the environment, directly from without as well as
indirectly from "memory loops," all codified, synthesized and decodified
in complex electro-neural processes. The importance of intelligence for
goal realization at the community level is readily observable in every
value process. In power processes, it is obvious that strategic planning
and operations rest upon knowledge of the environment as well as on
some indication of adversary plans. In the wealth process, intelligence
is a quantifiable product: advance knowledge of events created the
Rothschild fortune and "insider" knowledge is daily exploited in bourses
about the world. In skill processes, flows of reliable detailed knowledge
are equally critical. The same applies to community involvements in
the shaping and sharing of well-being and of every other valued
outcome.
For authoritative decision-making and execution, the need for
intelligence permeates every facet of decision. Promotional activities
are undertaken on the basis of intelligence about perceived interests
and prescriptions facilitating their realization. The formulation, con-
tent and modality of promulgation of prescriptions are all based upon
intelligence estimates of public order need and procedures for maxi-
mum effectiveness. The invoking of prescriptive norms depends on
intelligence about a threatened or actual breach. The applying function
is undertaken on the basis of intelligence estimates of the alternative
2. THE KAUTILYA ARTHASASTRA (Kangle ed. 1960). For a historical perspective
on the integration of clandestine intelligence in the legitimate diplomatic process,
see C. CARTER, THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF THE HABSBURGS, 1598-1625 (1964)
especially at 109-67.
3. S. KENT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 204-05 (1949); C. FRIEDRICH & Z.
BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY 167-68 (1956). And see
CONDITIONS, p. 428 infra.
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effects of executing or acquiescing in particular behaviors. Clearly,
the effective performance of each decision phase is intimately bound up
with the quantity, reliability, retrievability and exploitability of the
relevant intelligence.
The ubiquitousness of intelligence in the execution of every other
decision outcome has contributed to its low level of visibility. The
function frequently merges into promotive activity, particularly in the
world constitutive process where intelligence, disseminated through the
instruments of ideological strategy, easily becomes promotion. This
plurality of role is underlined by the difficulty of distinguishing between
intelligence and propaganda.4 The line between contextualized but
unpromoted intelligence and contextualized intelligence presented with
a degree of advocacy is extremely vague. And intelligence is frequently
confounded with appraisal. The distinctive task of appraisal is to
characterize developments in the past decision process according to the
degree of realization of policy objectives and to apportion degrees of
responsibility for the results. Intelligence differs from promotion and
appraisal in that its focus is primarily upon information, i.e. statements
which are designative rather than preferentiaP
Broadly conceived, intelligence is concerned with knowledge:
statements and propositions which have been confirmed by experience,
or to which a degree of probability can be assigned. Information, so
understood, includes projections and predictions. Valid intelligence
need not restrict itself to "proved" statements, but the probability of
accuracy of all statements, projections and predictions must be analyzed.
Nor does the term "intelligence" restrict itself to the products of a
single discipline. It is indicative of the deep fractionation of thinking
about the process of gathering and assembling knowledge for and about
human behavior that there is no single word readily available to desig-
nate, inclusively, the foci of the natural sciences, the social sciences, the
humanities and the arts.6 Intelligence may refer to all these cognitive
activities.
4. L. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA 12 (1957); see generally W.
DAVISON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION (1965); B. MURTY, PROPA-
GANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL
INSTRUMENT OF COERCION (1968).
5. This is not to imply that the intelligence function does not deal with com-
munity goals. One function of intelligence is the evaluation of goals in projected
contexts and the formulation of alternative goal sets for decisionmakers. The point
is that though intelligence is constantly involved with preferential sets, it does not
adopt one as its own and then proceed to promote it to decisionmakers in competition
with others.
6. The point is discussed in W. REISMAN (Rapporteur), Scientific Knowledge
Education and Communication, WORKING PAPER OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY AND THE AMERICAN DIVISION
OF THE WORLD ACADEMY OF ART AND SCIENCE (1970), 184 Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences 595 (1971).
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Sequential Phases
Sequentially, the intelligence function can be analyzed into three
key phases: (1) gathering, (2) processing and (3) dissemination.
Each phase is divisible into numerous components. Processing, for
example, includes assembling, coding, storing, decoding, retrieving,
interpreting and planning. The effectiveness of the total function
depends upon the efficacy with which each component is performed.
By gathering we refer to the diverse operations by which raw
information is collected.7 Gathering may be no more than the observa-
tion by an untrained individual of an event, as for example, the obser-
vation by a tourist of the concentration and orderly movement of an
armored force toward a border area, or the clipping of an article from
a foreign newspaper. On the other hand, it may be a highly sophisti-
cated operation, such as the deduction, from a number of equivocal and
apparently unrelated events, of a military technological advance; in-
deed, it may be performed by a programmed, non-human process.
Gathering may be carried on within an extremely rigorous normative
framework; for example, the gathering of facts and evidence for an
adjudicative proceeding.s However, it may transpire in an arena
characterized by rudimentary normative demands, as for example, the
clandestine collection of intelligence through espionage.9 Gathering
may be a complex process in which a large number of composite and
individual participants partake or it may be completed by the actions of
a single person. The common feature of all intelligence gathering is
the perception of an event and its delivery to a processing sequence.
The gathering of intelligence is not, however, a mechanical or
automatic procedure. The individual receptor-human or mechanical-
7. Observations about aspects of social process are, of course, parts of social
process and themselves affect the ongoing flow of events. We may, nonetheless,
distinguish between gathering operations which constitute an intense intervention in
some segment of social process and those whose degree of passive observation
approaches social innocuousness. The degree of intervention of the gathering process
has a number of important legal ramifications. For discussion, see p. 394 infra.
See also J. CARROLL, SECRETS OF ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE (1966). The broader effect
of gathering operations must, however, be considered in context and, in particular,
in terms of dissemination and uses of intelligence products: data gathered innocuously
may be used with brutal effects on the human being from whom it was gained.
8. It is interesting to note that physical scientists have relatively little under-
standing of the severe normative restraints which often attend social scientific
inquiry and, as a result, are often impatient with the secondary and indirect indicators
to which the social scientist resorts. A disciplined observational standpoint should
make clear that all investigation of social and physical process is subject to normative
demands, even, as in the following note, comparatively unstructured systems of
hostile interaction.
9. Normative demands do, of course, attend the collection of espionage; reciprocal
expectations of authority may be generated between contending parties. In certain
circumstances, espionage becomes a functional method of sharing information for
common purposes. See p. 394 infra.
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is inundated by a barrage of sensory stimuli which it is practically in-
capable of ingesting; were it so capable, its system would be overloaded
and broken, or it could not effectively digest what it had received. The
receptor exhibits a sensory selection, which enables it to accept a very
small segment of the stimulus flow impinging on it. For example, the
human being is capable, from a psycho-physical standpoint, of receiving
only certain environmental stimuli; and these receptivities may be
further attenuated by health, age, acculturation and other factors.
Mechanical receptors exhibit a comparable limitation, some of which
is to be attributed to deliberate or unpremeditated programming by its
human designers. An audial receiver may be limited to a certain range
of frequencies and magnitudes; it will not perceive other sounds and
will not register visual stimuli whose sonance counterpart falls outside
its programmed sensitivity. In short, the phases of the gathering
sequence are extremely complicated, and failure to appraise them with
contextual methods can seriously diminish the effectiveness of the entire
intelligence operation.
Intelligence gathering, it should be emphasized, is not restricted to
a focus outside the aggregate decision process served by the intelligence
function. Attention must be kept in relationship to the changing images
and curiosities of those who are involved in the decision process if the
flow of messages is to be kept relevant. The most appropriate con-
ception of the intelligence gathering function is not that of a one-way
circuit culminating in dissemination, but rather that of a closed or
"looped" circuit into which the needs and responses of the target of
dissemination are constantly fed back to gatherers and processors.
By processing, we refer to the many intermediate sequences of the
intelligence process prior to dissemination. In the individual, such
processing refers initially to the assembly and codification of clusters of
unrefined environmental stimuli, then the storage of this information,
and finally retrieval and decodification in response to new stimuli. In
the individual psychosomatic entity, these processes apparently occur
electrochemically in the brain, but the process is as yet only faintly
understood. In a large-scale organization, processing is carried on by a
variety of techniques that range from the most elementary filing system
to storage in enormously intricate computer brains. The recent revolu-
tion in intelligence processing can only be understated.10 In the United
States Department of State, for example, foreign area "files" in the pre-
World War II period were so modest that a standard joke was that
10. F. MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1962); see gmerally R. GREENE, BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND
ESPIONAGE (1966); C. ELLIOTT & R. WASLEY. BUSINESS INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEMS (1965).
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they consisted of N.Y. Times and Washington Post clippings stuffed
into the top desk drawer of the respective bureau chief. In contrast, the
potentialities of contemporary technology for processing are staggering.
Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence process. In it the
receiver is identified, his needs are assessed and appropriate information
is transmitted. As in gathering and processing, dissemination may be
an extremely simple, single-step operation; for example, delivery of a
file by messenger from one bureaucratic unit to another. On the other
hand, dissemination may be an extremely complex operation in which
a flow of data about the predispositions of the target is appraised and
possible outgoing messages are reformulated accordingly. Different
outputs, for example, may be prepared for diplomatic or ideological
strategies.
Viewing the intelligence sequences as a whole, two principal points
deserve to be emphasized. Both the quantity and the quality of the
outflow depend on interdependences throughout the several operations
involved. Effectiveness is determined by a steady two-way flow of
information about the larger environment as well as about the intelli-
gence process itself. The objectives of primary observers are con-
tinually influenced by the presumed needs of the disseminees as well as
by the available capacity of processors to. codify, store and retrieve data.
Comparably, the disseminators are constantly affected by what has
gone before and by their images of the recipients.
A second outstanding feature of the whole intelligence process is
the potential diversity of. the persons who are adapted to particular
operations. In some circumstances, one individual may necessarily
perform every task. More typically, intelligence agencies are organized
to utilize an enormous network of individuals and groups who act
jointly and in sequence. Particular gatherers, processers or even dis-
seminators may have little or no awareness of the chain of which they
are a link. We will treat intelligence generally and globally, for our
present scope does not permit each sequence to be given systematic
consideration. Yet where sequential phases are critical, they will be
noted.
I. THE CLARIFICATION OF BASIC CONSTITUTIVE POLICIES
If the policies affecting the constitutive structure and functions of
the world community are to move toward the realization of at least
minimum public order, the intelligence component of the decision
process must harmonize as far as possible with criteria designed to pro-
vide the pertinent flow of communicated messages to all who participate
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in authoritative control. Among relevant criteria, we cite in par-
ticular the goals of dependability, comprehensiveness (within which we
include systematic contextuality), selectivity (relevance), creativity,
openness, availability and economy. Trend studies indicate that a low
measure of performance in relation to anyone of these goals has limited
both the minimum effectiveness as well as long range optimum aims of
intelligence.
Dependability
An intelligence process is dependable when the messages delivered
to the recipients are realistic and when the recipients perceive them as
such. Among the factors that condition the realism of the output are
the estimates by the intelligence suppliers that their audiences are able
and willing to recognize and accept realistic communications. If the
recipients are to perceive communications as credible, their image of the
source must acknowledge competence and good faith.
When dependability is conceived as an interpersonal relationship,
certain criteria of high performance become salient:
1. The source is competent. An intelligence agency will utilize the
services of those who have the training and experience to make a
realistic statement.
2. The source is motivated to supply realistic statements. Con-
scious and unconscious motivations are both involved and require
evaluation.
3. Competence must be applied to the pertinent situation. The
question is whether there was an opportunity to use appropriate
methods and whether they were actually employed.
4. Statements must be accurately transmitted.
5. Recipients must be able and willing to acknowledge the credi-
bility of realistic statements.
In order to maximize their respective value positions, intelligence
producers and intelligence consumers have resorted to converging pro-
cedures, which have resulted in functional standards for reciprocal
dependability. Among the expedients adopted by intelligence organs
which have a bearing on reliability are competitive examinations, di-
rected at ascertaining optimum levels of skill, natural capacity and
psychological stability. Personnel are usually committed by oath to
loyalty and typically grasp the authoritative and controlling code of
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conduct to which they are expected to conform. The dependability of
their intelligence activities is subject to constant appraisal. These
arrangements, which are commonplace at the national level, are also
adopted by international fact-finding commissions. A commission's
statute will set out criteria for personnel choice, the necessary level of
impartiality, and specify the mandatory techniques for data collection,
appraisal and formulation. ll In formal legal processes, in which data
is collected and tested in adversarial procedure, comparable standards
are expressed in principles of admissibility, credibility and relevance.12
In unorganized processes, standards are frequently set by the in-
telligence producers themselves, both as an expression, in a group code,
of personal demands for quality and integrity as well as for strategic
purposes: the value of intelligence and the ongoing valuation of intel-
ligence producers are commensurate with their dependability. It is no
surprise that one may speak of a code of honor among spies, for if they
fail to project an image of dependability, they will have abjured their
most important professional base and will not be retained by intelli-
gence consumers. Assessors, pollsters, valuators, scientific investi-
gators and, indeed, any skill group transacting intelligence set and police
levels of dependability for comparable reasons.
Comprehensiveness
It is a commonplace that perception is not a random process but
is based upon and facilitated by internal and environmental data organi-
zation, by a process of relation, of gestalt. The accuracy and utility of
intelligence in an increasingly interdependent world depend directly
upon a comprehensive and systematic contextuality. This is based upon
a conception of social process as a vast manifold of events, interacting
and interstimulating, the meaning, relevance and susceptibility to in-
fluence of any part of which are dependent upon its relation to the whole.
The specifications of comprehensive coverage follow from the
problem-solving character of decision. The flow of communications
that reaches the organizations or individuals who shape the world de-
cision process must achieve:
1. Inclusiveness in terms of goal. Every participant pursues
values of every kind; hence, the map supplied by intelligence services,
11. See, e.g., 1907 REVISED HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, arts. 9-36; see generally,
W. SHORE, FACT-FINDING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE (1970).
12. For a comprehensive presentation of such rules and some comparative evalua-
tion, see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1935). On the implications of accuracy of
this type of proceeding, see ]. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT
(1966). Frank, Facts and Guesses in B. KRISTEIN, A MAN'S REACH 180 (1965).
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overt or covert, covers the ups and downs of political power, the chang-
ing levels of wealth production and consumption, and similar modifica-
tions in the accumulation and distribution of enlightenment, well-being,
skill, affection, respect and rectitude. Failure to emphasize any value--
such, for example, as scientific enlightenment-may lead to a subtle
downgrading of scientific outcomes among the value priorities of de-
cisionmakers. Or failure to reiterate the facts of inequality may have
a similar effect on the everyday emphasis that is put on policies de-
signed to realize the value-distribution required by considerations of
human dignity.
2. Inclusiveness in regard to trends. The decisionmakers in one
part of the globe may allow themselves to float on clouds of euphoria
if their attention is directed almost exclusively to favorable changes in
their value position. If the intelligence services do their job realistically
attention will be directed to the negative as well as the positive.
3. Inclusiveness in the presentation of conditioning factors. The
political myth of every significant participant includes standard "expla-
nations" if things go well or badly. In the latter case the "scapegoat"
may be the machinations of the foreign "imperialist" or international
"agitator." One of the principal responsibilities of adequate intelli-
gence services is to examine a comprehensive set of possible explana-
tions and to include the most likely interpretation of events in their
output.J3
4. Inclusiveness of projections. Since all decisions point toward
the future, one task of the intelligence suppliers is to avoid surprises
that come from incomplete projection of probable sequences of future
development.
5. Inclusiveness of policy alternatives. It is generally admitted
that decisionmakers tend to divert their attention from proposals that
seem to contradict their assumptions. Hence, the requirement of in-
clusiveness calls for a stream of intelligence in which the whole range
of proposed policies and strategies obtains representation.
Selectivity
The body of potentially relevant intelligence is so enormous, and
the man hours of attention are so few, that one of the principal criteria
13. Thus Professor Wasserman: "The only satisfactory basis for intelligence
prediction is the universalizable or objective standard of estimating the actions of
other States rationally in terms of their assumptions." Wasserman, The Failure of
Intelligence Prediction, 8 POLITICAL STUDIES 157, 168 (1960).
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of a sound intelligence operation refers to selectivity. A comprehensive
viewpoint sensitizes the data gatherers, processors and disseminators
to the landscape as a whole and paves the way for scrutinizing with
particular care the features that merit selective notice. Working
criteria include:
1. Relate intelligence to perceived problems. The principal con-
cern of any operation is with the client. If the client is to give serious
attention to what is reported, the messages must appear to deal with
the issues that press for resolution. When the structure of the UN
Security Council is under attack it is evident that news which reports
the extent of criticism, defense or indifference is relevant. The obliga-
tion of the intelligence function goes beyond the furnishing of infor-
mation about problems currently recognized by the client to the task
of making the recipient aware of developments that concern him but of
which he is presently unaware. The perceiver of the problem in this
case is initially the intelligence operators themselves.
2. Give priority to policy alternatives. Some problems are so
immediate and concern so many people with so many values at stake
that intelligence services are most helpful when they concentrate on
succinct presentations of possible objectives and strategies of action.
The statements chosen for transmission should be those that have been
disciplined by exposure to the procedures of the intelligence operation
which assess available material, not only for reliability, but for
relevance.
Timeliness
A criterion that is intimately bound up with selectivity but which
is of such great importance for the whole decision process that it de-
serves separate billing is timeliness. It is, after all, necessary for the
world community to depend on a properly functioning intelligence
operation for the discovery of changes that signify an incipient emer-
gency. Less dramatic and exceptional is the requirement that whatever
is needed should be promptly made available whenever it is needed to
whoever needs it. Whether the arena is promotional, prescriptive, or
relatively specialized to some other decision function, the implacable
march of time sets a limit on research, on preparation, on deliberation:
moments of decisive significance come and pass, and they often leave
in their wake a trajn of missed opportunities. Poor intelligence work
failed to locate the text of a crucial agreement, to provide a telling sum-
mary of research on pollution, to indicate the changing sentiments of a
seemingly recalcitrant coalition-and so on and on through the "might
have beens" of human history.
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Creativity
We have emphasized the forward-looking, planning role of the
intelligence function; and this is to underscore the creative challenge
implicit in the operation. At no step in the decision sequence is the
exercise of creativity more apparent or more contributory than at the
phase of planning. To plan in the constitutive process is to clarify'
inclusive goals and particular objectives and to invent strategies that
allow the world community to move from where it is at any given
moment to a preferred future state of affairs.
Among the working guides to creativity are these:
1. Cultivate diversity of approach to planning problems. This
implies the use of interdisciplinary talent, which increases the proba-
bility that a new potentiality may be recognized. In our interactive,
accelerated world, the realms of the physical, biological and cultural are
simultaneously implicated to a degree that requires continual surveil-
lance by multi-disciplinary teams who are concerned with the technical,
administrative, legal and support strategies required by massive change.
A new device for detecting nuclear weapons, a novel method of sharing
corporate control, a jurisprudential doctrine that emphasizes expecta-
tions, a political science research that locates the most innovative elite
elements: these are among the contributions that may release creative
solutions to problems of transnational structure. In addition to multi-
disciplinary orientations it is obvious that many other diversities are
worth bringing into intelligence planning: differences of culture, inter-
est, personality, sex or class; differences of official or unofficial ex-
perience and so on.
2. Institutionalize the challenging of assumptions. The Roman
Catholic Church has long utilized the Devil's Advocate as a means of
bringing to the attention of decisionmakers the data and the arguments
that might otherwise be neglected or de-emphasized. The procedure
can be adapted to the internal decision process in intelligence
organizations.
Openness
In the light of the pervading goal of human dignity which we
project for our preferred world public order, an unqualified openness in
the gathering and dissemination of decisionally relevant intelligence is
a necessary long-range criterion. Openness is an essential both in
terms of the maximum effectiveness of the intelligence process itself
and in terms of the greatest possible participation of all individuals in
world constitutive decision.
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The criteria include:
1. Openness to available intelligence.
2. Openness to contribution to intelligence.
3. Mobilization of demand for participation m the intelligence
process.
The criterion of openness is a commitment against monopoly and
an endorsement of participation in the shaping and sharing of the total
stream of intelligence. Among analysts of government it is common-
place to emphasize the fundamental character of knowledge as a base
of power, as indeed of values that are in any degree dependent on a
realistic map of the social and physical settingY A persistent disparity
between the quantity and quality of intelligence made available to elites
on the one hand and to rank-and-file members on the other is a reliable
indicator of elite monopolization of power and of other value assets.
A striking fact about monopolistic practices in intelligence opera-
tions is that they are so often self-defeating.15 When barriers of
secrecy are imposed in crisis situations, it may be possible for a
centralized elite to obtain the advantages of surprise. Yet secrecy so
often breeds further secrecy, and secrecy so characteristically generates
conscious and unconscious interest in omission, distortion and routine
that the monopolist may overlook the urgency of altering the structures
and functions of the system of public order with which he is identified.
vVe stressed the importance of interpreting the task of intelligence
operations to include the task of mobilizing general participation at all
stages of the process. Such motivation is indispensable if the members
of the body politic are to keep themselves informed. Many factors tend
to result in attitudes of indifference or aversion to the effort required
to keep adequately abreast of significant developments. If intelligence
results are presented to recipients in a dull and routine fashion, the
consequence may be less and less insistence on obtaining an intelligence
supply that meets the emergency needs of the world community.
Modern technology is not only rich in devices that facilitate the gather-
ing, storage and retrieval of data but has also developed many media
of communication-print, film, television-that are well adapted to the
14. See, e.g., D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965); S. KENT, supra note 3,
at 3-10; H. WILENSKY, supra note I, at 3-7. Under certain circumstances the
symbols of knowledge may perform ritualistic, even magic functions, quite sep~rate
from the storage or dissemination of data about social process.
15. H. WILENSKY, supra note I, at 130-72; E. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY
153-91 (1956); M. MCGUIRE, SECRECY AND THE ARMS RACE: A THEORY OF THE
ACCUMULATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND How SECRECY AFFECTS IT 212-32
(1965).
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task of arousing audience interest by vivid and concrete messages and
styles of presentation.
Mobilization is significant for the shapers as well as the sharers of
intelligence. One never knows in advance which individual or organi-
zation will occupy positions in the social process that enable them to
observe events that ought to be reported to the collectivity. Officials
who snub volunteers, or who interview in a perfunctory manner, are
damaging the roots of an operation whose nourishment may come from
the wider, even humbler, layers of the whole community.
The point is most apparent, perhaps, in traditional societies where
many strata are accustomed to perceive themselves as outside the de-
cision process of the larger community. Among the tribes or the castes
of many localities the inhabitants are well-aware of festering grievances
that may erupt in challenges to public order. Yet the lack of regular
political participation has confirmed an image of the self as lacking in
salience to the mysterious umbrellas of public authority and control.
"Knowing their place" they comply humbly and obediently-and bide
their time. In a society so structured, the narrow gathering but wide
dissemination of intelligence may be socially integrative in that it
reiterates the symbols of community. At the same time it will be
democratically regressive, in that by enhancing a status quo already
sanctioned in popular lore, it narcotizes any incipient demands to par-
ticipate fully and equally in processes of authoritative decision.
Nor will an unrestricted flow of intelligence engender constitutive
participation by those personalities which, because of personal psychic
experience, are incapable of viewing themselves as equal participants in
the community process or are so ambivalent in regard to all authority
that they can fulfill neither active nor passive authority roles. The
emphatic point, common to all these disabilities, is that from a consti-
tutive perspective, the preferred goal of openness cannot, in itself, pro-
vide assured enhancement of genuine power sharing and wider partici-
pation in decision. Intelligence will only approximate these goals when
it operates in a context of constitutive and public order structures, at all
levels of global interaction, which facilitates the development and
maturation of personalities capable of absorbing intelligence products
into a personal conceptual framework, which includes stable notions of
their own active and legitimate participation in processes of authority
and power.
Economy
The intelligence needs of the contemporary world constitutive
process are enormous; the scope is spatially coterminous with the very
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limits of the earth-space arena, extends temporally from the distant past
into a future whose foreseeability is a function of man's capacity to
engage in systematic prediction, and ranges over every critical value
process in diverse and changing contexts. But resource allocation for
the intelligence process is necessarily limited and must compete with
the legitimate needs of all other constitutive and public order functions.
As matters stand today the divided structure of the world arena
stimulates and maintains vast intelligence structures whose operations
are transnational but whose beneficiaries are, as far as possible, more
parochial. These organizations are monuments to the waste of re-
sources inherent in the present system of world public order, and
provide some indication of the economies that can be realized when
hostile or duplicative surveillance are superseded, and assets are re-
directed to the direct service of common interests.
II. TRENDS IN PAST PERFORMANCE
Trends in past performance of the global intelligence function
represent only the most fragmentary approximation to the preferred
constitutive goals which have been recommended. The aggregate pro-
duction of intelligence has increased markedly, but increase in the
quantity and relevance of disseminated material has been less marked.
The function continues to be more exclusive than inclusive in reach
and control. Trends can be most conveniently summarized in terms
of the seven components of any function.
A. Participants
Those who participate in processes of constitutive intelligence fill
two concentric roles: intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.
These roles necessarily overlap, even on the individual level, and it is
important to mark this convergence as a dominating aspect of the in-
telligence function. All behavior is in part a response to continuous
flows of contextual information, which varies widely both in its ac-
curacy, relevance and timeliness as well as in the capacity of the intel-
ligence user to comprehend and exploit it. Thus, even the participant
who views himself as an intelligence gatherer is constantly incorporating
the results of his activity into his present and projected behavior. In
short, intelligence gatherers, no matter what their self-perceived role
and no matter what the manifest target of their activity, are their own
initial consumers. A critical facet of intelligence activities is their re-
flexive, feed-back properties. The professional intelligence a-gent, the
mass media, the commercial intelligence unit and so on undergo indi-
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vidual perspective-shaping by their participation in the process. Parallel
results transpire if the process is considered sequentially, in terms of
gatherers, processors and disseminators. The disseminator-promoter,
who consciously manipulates the intelligence products at his disposal in
order to form certain perspectives in the minds of his target audience,
is, in varying degree, propagandized by his own propaganda.
We consider below in systematic form the major participants in
the world constitutive function of intelligence.
1. Nation-States
The revolution in intelligence gathering is felt most strongly in
nation-state intelligence activities. Disposing of a high degree of
political control within their territories and capable of marshalling vast
resources for the collection of intelligence, the contemporary nation-
state has always been one of the foremost gatherers and processors of
constitutive intelligence. There is an enormous increase in the num-
bers of individuals involved in the various sequences of the intelligence
function, an extension of specializations and a proliferation of techno-
logical devices.16 In crisis periods, intelligence has acquired a dimen-
sion of heightened importance in the public mind, moving from the
position of a service to decisionmakers to a highly vulnerable political
issue. Indeed, intelligence scandals have rocked and brought down a
number of western governments in the past decade.l1
Much attention has been directed to the security intelligence
agencies of modern governments: CIA and NSA in the United States,
MJ.5 and M.L6 in the United Kingdom, the S.LS. in France, the
NKVD in the U.S.S.R. and so on. Yet these agencies perform only a
fraction of the intelligence gathering, processing and dissemination of
modern government. Less glamorous, but no less effective are the vast
intelligence gathering activities of a variety of government departments
and agencies. The departments of commerce, industry, labor and the
treasury and their functional equivalents in any governmental system
perforce gather and process vast quantities of information about the
world constitutive process as a necessary condition of their own de-
cision-making.18 Defense and related departments obviously base their
16. F. MACHLUP, supra note 10, at 295-322, 380-400; for a dramatic inventory
of surveillance techniques, see V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964).
17. The Philby, Burgess and McLean case and the Profumo case in the United
Kingdom engendered enormous internal political consequences; they also shook ex-
ternal alliances which coordinated the sharing of security intelligence. See gellerally
B. PAGE, D. LEITCH, P. KNIGHTLEY, K. PHILBY: THE Spy WHO BETRAYED A
GENERATION (1969). A comparable scandal was set off by the defection of Martin
and Mitchell in 1960, see S. DE GRAMONT, THE SECRET WAR 404 (1962).
18. S. KENT, supra note 3, at 104-15; H. RANSOM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 94-130 (1958).
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own planning on an interpersonal model in which knowledge of the
plans and practices of others is an absolute requisite. Foreign Offices
continuously collect and process intelligence about the postures and
plans of other nations. Special task forces are regularly formed with
special mandates to investigate particular areas of global interaction.
A crucial modality of intelligence gathering for the nation-state is
found in the network of diplomatic personnel dispersed throughout the
globe. In addition to serving as a conduit of communications to foreign
elites, a major function of the diplomatic and consular corps is to col-
lect intelligence about the host state, an activity which is facilitated
greatly by the institution of diplomatic immunity.
Although the policy, planning and operating officers of the
federal government (both civilian and military) are the pri-
mary users (or consumers) of the finished intelligence
product, they themselves are often important gatherers and
producers. As men who work in the world of affairs they
turn out, as by-products of their main jobs, large amounts of
material which iii the subject matter of strategic intelligence.
The best case in point is the foreign service officer in a foreign
post. His main job is representing the United States' inter-
est in that country, but a very important by-product of his
work is the informational cable, dispatch, or report which he
sends in. Not merely the informational cable but the so-called
"operational" cable as well. . . . the foreign service officer,
although not specially trained as an intelligence man, is by
virtue of his location and talent often a valuable and effective
purveyor of intelligence.19
Gathering extends from the innocuous reading of the local press
and professional journals to a more active collection in the field. It is
customary to append to a large mission military attaches of the various
services as well as experts in other fields in which the sending state has
an interest. Since reciprocity is the core of legation and mission size,
the host state acquires comparable rights in the territory of the sending
state. Although they are not mentioned in the Vienna Convention or
in the major texts,20 these intelligence activities are accepted as a cor-
relative purpose of diplomatic activity and are tolerated with a high
19. S. KENT, supra note 3, at 9-10; H. RANSOM, supra note 18, at 119-30;
Evans, Research and Intelligence: The Part They Play in Foreign Policy, FOREIGN
SERVICE JOURNAL 24 (March 1957).
20. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 3(1) (d) (1961), 500
U.N.T.S. 95 98; see also Espionage Activities of Personnel Attached to Em-
bassies and 'Consulates Under Soviet Domination in the United States, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. o,~ the Judiciary, 82d Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (1952).
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degree of latitude. Expulsions of diplomats for intelligence activities
have usually been motivated by clear breaches of domestic espionage
laws, in particular, conspiring with nationals of the host state to steal
official information.21 The normative frame provided by such laws are
the outer limits of diplomatic intelligence gathering.
The richness of national constitutive intelligence operations has
been undermined by a number of recurring factors. In an atmosphere
of crisis, the security value of the intelligence which has been collected
has frequently impelled its general suppression and restricted dissemina-
tion to a limited elite coterie. "Need to know" policies have often re-
tained the processed intelligence within the agency or department which
is ultimately obliged to use it. A consequence of this pattern has been
the attenuation of possibilities of disengaged appraisal and a merger of
intelligence, with promotion and application.22 Hence the real utility
of intelligence has been eroded. In particular, the open utilization of
intelligence by all for realization of the common interest has been
sacrificed.
2. International Organizations
The bureaucratic structures of the major international orgamza-
tions engage in numerous intelligence activities. At the same time,
many of these structures collect and disseminate intelligence by complex
osmotic strands, which frequently prove extremely effective despite
their low level of visibility. Thus, the Secretariat of the United
Nations, to choose only one example, provides formally within its
cellular bureaucracy for the gathering, processing and disseminating of
constitutive intelligence. The Codification Division of the legal affairs
section, for example, is specialized to processing specific material. The
United Nations Press Office acts as a formal disseminator, and main-
tains facilities through which intelligence products are channeled
quickly into nation-state media.23 But in addition to these formal ad-
ministrative units, Secretariat personnel are constantly involved in in-
telligence functions which do not appear labeled under this title.
Within the formal structures of the Organization, Secretariat repre-
sentatives sit in a variety of conferences and committees. An in-
evitable product of their presence is the gathering and channelling back
21. Some sense of the complexity of and requisite delicacy in responding to
these cases is found in L. TOBIASSEN, THE RELUCTANT DOOR: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO THE UNITED NATIONS 308 (1969).
22. H. WILENSKY, supra note 1, at 48-57 and especially at 24-34; see also
C. P. SNOW, SCIENCE AND GoVERNMENT 46, 104 (1960).
23. See A. SZALAI, M. CROKE & ASSOCIATES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
NEWS MEDIA (UNITAR, 1972).
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of information about proceedings in which they act as participant-
observers. As the scale of their participation in these micro-arenas
increases, they become disseminators of Secretariat views. Regional
offices of the Organization, strategically placed about the globe, perform
comparable functions.
Organs of international organizations are frequently directed by
their membership to perform specific intelligence functions directly re-
lated to constitutive decision. Thus, the Secretary General maintains
a directory of the status of multilateral conventions: adherences, re-
ciprocal rights and terminations.24 This service provides a ready
indicator of the extent of agreement to formal constitutive prescriptions.
The Economic and Social Council, and in particular, the network of
regional economic commissions, GATT, UNCTAD and OECD are
involved in enormous intelligence activities regarding transnational
wealth processes. The IMF, the International Bank and the regional
banks collect, process and disseminate information about transnational
monetary trends and the fluctuations of national economies.
UNESCO's intelligence activities relate to trends in enlightenment,
skills and related value transactions.25 The World Health Organiza-
tion collects and disseminates information about trends in transnational
well-being,26 and the F AO collects and processes trends in regard to
the world's food resources.27
These selected examples of organizational intelligence activities
indicate that the aggregate activities of contemporary international
organizations provide a rather comprehensive and timely flow of intelli-
gence about the world constitutive process. Perhaps more significant,
the available structures represent institutional potentialities for a highly
effective constitutive intelligence function. The major shortcomings to
date have been the lack of a comprehensive conception of the goals and
ramifications of constitutive intelligence, which has limited the scope
and focus of the activities and, equally pernicious, the absence of a
centralized dearing house capable of absorbing and consolidating the
many fragmented intelligence pictures into a coherent, contextual and
comprehensive presentation of the requirements of the entire constitu-
tive process. Without such a broad frame, the true relevance of many
of the individual intelligence efforts is lost.
24. On the legal problems involved, see W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION
381-83 (1971); and see Right of Passage Case [1957] I.C]. 125.
25. For a brief survey of the scope which UNESCO seeks, see REPORT OF THE
SECRETARy-GENERAL, PROBLEMS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. E/4667
at 54-58 (1969).
26. Id. at 58-63.
27. Id. at 49-54.
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We have concentrated on constitutive intelligence activities of the
international organizations. It is appropriate to note briefly some
organizational activity in the collection of public order intelligence
since it demonstrates techniques of institutional participation and, in
certain cases, provides peripheral constitutive intelligence. Fact-finding
commissions and commissions of inquiry antedate the rise of con-
temporary international organization.28 These practices have been used
by nation-states on bilateral and plurilateral bases and by 1899 a major
effort at the codification of their procedure succeeded and gained wide
adherence.29 The technique of the fact-finding commission and the
commission of inquiry has been adopted by many international organi-
zations and put to use in diverse contexts. The General Assembly of
the United Nations, for example, has created commissions of inquiry
and directed them into the field to collect intelligence about a yariety
of public order questions.so A major precedent produced by this
activity has been the incipient legitimization of organizational intelli-
gence collecting within the territorial bounds of member-states. A
variant institutional form used by the International Labor Organization
is the Committee of Experts, formed in 1957. The Committee receives
the formal national reports to the ILO and, in addition, solicits in-
formation from both local employer and worker organizations. This
fact-finding device appears to have been remarkably successfu1.31
Clandestine intelligence activities are usually associated with
nation-states. It should, however, be no surprise that as activities
requiring secrecy in intelligence gathering become increasingly trans-
national, formal international organizations find it necessary to resort
to clandestine intelligence. International action against the world
narcotics trade, for example, requires a relatively secret intelligence
network in order to be effective. In the future, other forms of inter-
national crime will presumably inspire counterpart official secret
activities.
28. See W. SHORE, supra note 11 and L. SOHN, THE FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION TODAY (1963). See also The Dogger Bank Incident, 1 Hague Recueil
17-18, Hague Court Reports (Scott) 403 (1916).
29. 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, arts. 9-14; 1907 REVISED HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCE, arts. 9-36.
30. See U.N. CHARTER art. 34. The investigative capacity is discussed in
L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 245 (1949). See
also L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 176 (1955). One of the earliest mandates for
fact-finding given by the Security Council is found in 1 U.N. SCaR 1st ser. No. 28
at 700-1 (1946).
31. E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 250-52 (1964); E. LANDY, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION 19-34 (1966).
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3. Political Parties and Political Orders
The gathering of intelligence by political parties and political
orders is a regular accompaniment of their normal participation in de-
cision activities. The unique characteristic of a political order, of
course, is its self-entertained notion of its exclusive legitimacy of power.
Accordingly it collects and processes intelligence as a base of its own
power and does not disseminate it beyond its own structural borders.
The Communist party maintains a vast intelligence network throughout
the world. During one period, the network was publicly acknowledged
as the Cominform and served as a two-way conduit in every country
in which it operated. Intelligence gathered was channeled back to the
Soviet elite. At the same time, intelligence which had been processed
for dissemination by that elite was channeled back into the foreign
media through the same network,32 The National Socialist political
order operated a similar intelligence system drawing on sympathizers
and irredentist and overseas ethnic Germans.as
A number of features appear to be characteristic of intelligence
activities of political orders. Foremost is the monopolization of intelli-
gence for the aggrandizement or maintenance of political power. A
political order does not view itself as one part of a collaborative
political process, but rather as the process or, pro-futuro, as the ex-
clusively legitimate heir to control of the process. With these sub-
strate perspectives, the political order's notion of maximization of
values is not the supplementary distribution of intelligence for power
sharing purposes, but rather the regulated dissemination of intelligence
for purposes of improving its own value position. In this respect, the
disseminative sequences of intelligence products by political orders are
invariably propagandistic or promotive; even truthful intelligence which
is disseminated publicly is selected from a total context in order to
engender certain desired perspectives on the part of the target audience.
A second feature of political orders is the rather constricted use which
their perspectives seem to impose upon their exploitation of intelligence.
Evidently there is an inverse relation between rigidity of ideological
outlook and capacity to make full use of a wealth of gathered intelli-
gence.S4 Other factors, such as crisis, with its time pressures, will of
32. E. BARGHOORN, SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA (1964); ]. HULSE, THE
FORMING OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (1964).
33. P. LEVERKUEHN, GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (1954).
34. Hitler's failure to make use of intelligence available to him has been dis-
cussed earlier. Stalin fell prey to the same hubris: A. ORLOV, HANDBOOK OF INTEL-
LIGENCE AND GUERILLA WARFARE 9-11 (1963). But cf. B. WHALLEY, THE BAR-
BAROSSA CODE (1973) discussed p. 445 infra. Unquestionably, political leaders of
the West have exhibited the same weakness. In addition to this pathology, refusal
to heed intelligence estimates may derive from a complex of other factors, many of
which are, in context, plausible.
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course act detrimentally upon the exploitation of intelligence. How-
ever, the most obvious phenomenon is the retardation of intelligence
exploitation in consequence of rigidified ideology. There is evidence
now available that neither Stalin, nor Hitler nor Mao could process
and absorb critical intelligence which was brought to their attention.sli
National and international political parties gather intelligence in a
variety of institutionalized and non-institutionalized patterns. Periodi-
cally, large parties engage in formal and highly institutionalized intel-
ligence operations. The Democratic and Republican parties in the
United States, for example, customarily hold open hearings before each
presidential election for purposes of framing the party platform. Wit-
nesses who claim expertise in various areas appear to provide intel-
ligence and to promote policies for the consideration of the party.
Particularly noteworthy from the standpoint of the world constitutive
process is the emerging trend among opposition parties to finance com-
missions that are sent abroad to gather intelligence on which opposition
policies are grounded. Parties often call upon loyal members who are
strategically placed in official and unofficial structures to furnish intel-
ligence which is not otherwise public.
Because a political order may include among its power assets the
resources of entire nation-states, political orders may, in certain circum-
stances, rank with nation-states as among the foremost participants in
the world constitutive intelligence process. True political parties, on
the other hand, must engage in more diffuse and sporadic intelligence
activities because they lack large resource bases. On the other hand,
insofar as they are not associated with official power structures nor
committed to firm policy, they may be more receptive to and capable
of utilizing whatever intelligence is gleaned.
4. Pressure and Interest Groups
Transnational and national pressure and interest groups are notable
intelligence producers and consumers. Their attention is generally
limited to the value pursuit in which they specialize, but within this
limit they frequently have the greatest knowledge. International car-
tels, for example, may monopolize not only economic decision in a sub-
35. S. KENT, supra note 3, at 204. Mao's "great leap forward" was presented
with detailed expert obj ections, but nevertheless pressed to its disastrous end. The
apparent incapacity to adopt and act on certain types of information in an intensely
ideological system can be attributed to more subtle social factors. Where for
example, intelligence requires a change in elite structure or elite personnel, those
elites who will probably suffer deprivation will find ways of rejecting the intelligence.
In charismatic systems, one base of power of the leader may be his "gift" for making
the right decision. Hence, he may be obliged to exercise and sustain this base of
power even if a wrong decision (in an objective sense) must be taken.
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sector of wealth, but they may have the only comprehensive and realistic
information about the economic and other consequences of the policies
pursued. An organization such as the International Air Transport
Association, which among other activities sets rate and tariff guidelines
in international civil aviation, has been said consistently to suppress the
vast amount of detail about costs and effects which it regularly gathers.
Air carriers clarify policy in a private arena and thereafter disseminate
their selected version of reality in public international and national
decision arenas.36 Other international cartels practice similar monopo-
lization of the intelligence relevant to their activities.
Pressure and interest groups do not always enjoy exclusive con-
trol of essential intelligence. In broadest perspective, the world arena
is pluralistic, composed of diverse groups pursuing different values.
Many of these groups must draw upon whatever base values are at
their disposal in order to meet their intelligence needs. The interplay
among these organizations generates a flow of publicly accessible infor-
mation in open arenas at every level of the world community. A rather
regular feature of parliamentary democracies is the institution of lobbies
conducted by pressure and interest groups operating directly upon legis-
lative processes.37 A large part of these activities is the dissemination
of intelligence.3s While lobbying is frequently abused and is constitu-
tively marred by the absence of explicit normative structures, its aggre-
gate effect is provision of a rich flow of intelligence to prescriptive
processes. Significantly, lobbying is an emergent trend in organized
international arenas. An increasing number of non-governmental
organizations (NGO's) seek and acquire consultative status in refer-
ence to the principal organs of the United Nations, and from this posi-
tion disseminate intelligence to the international community in the value
areas in which they are interested.39 Other national and international
NGO's gather and disseminate information through non-official com-
municational channels which ultimately reach national and international
decisionmakers.
36. K. PILLAI, THE AIR NET: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD AVIATION CARTEL
(1969).
37. Some sense of the range of international lobbies and pressure groups can
be gained from L. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1951); J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NON-GoVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND EcONOMIC ENTITIES (1963), and see note 57 infra.
38. See generally, INTEREST GROUPS ON FOUR CONTINENTS (H. Ehrmann ed.
1954); H. WILENSKY, supra note 1, at 124-25. The most comprehensive listing is
found in THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (12th ed. 1969) . almost
2000 non-governmental organizations are registered there. '
39. According to the most recent survey available, 10 organizations have been
accorded status (Category) A, 131 status (Category) Band 219 status (Register) C.
EVERYMANS UNITED NATIONS 19-20 (8th ed. 1968).
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There are, unfortunately, few detailed studies of contemporary
vintage of the performance of decision functions in the constitutive
process by NGO's. The available data would, however, suggest that
the intelligence role of these associations is tremendous. There is no
value process which is not well represented by such organizations.40
Nor, within each value process is there utter homogeneity of outlook.
Within the several sectors of the social process, pressure groups pursue
partially integrated, partially antagonistic interpretations of interest.
These diversities ensure some measure of policing in terms of the com-
mon interest of the wider community. If no organization is sufficiently
impartial to supply objective intelligence, the aggregate flow of con-
flicting versions may nevertheless facilitate the separation of fact, false-
hood and fantasy from one another. Insofar as these groups permit
direct individual participation in the world constitutive process, their
immediate and long-range psychological impact on the development of
a common identity is incalculable. Constitutive prescriptions facili-
tating the intelligence operations of these organizations are a matter of
overwhelming international interest.
5. Private Associations
Private associations with transnational interests frequently per-
form intelligence operations as an activity ancillary to their dominant
concern. We have had occasion to mention the intelligence gathering
and disseminating activities of the Roman Catholic Church.41 Com-
parable activities are performed by other ecclesiastical organizations,
including rectitude conglomerates which retain their theological dif-
ferences while formulating convergent objectives in the world constitu-
tive process. The World Council of Churches, the Protestant Assem-
blies, the Jewish organizations and most recently the Buddhist
organizations play an increasingly prominent world political role.42
International business associations regularly collect intelligence
commensurate with their preoccupation with wealth and the geographic
scope of their activities. Insofar as their actual or planned operations
impinge upon the world constitutive process, they may utilize the in-
formation which they have collected for the purpose of influencing
40. See note 57 infra and in particular, L. WHITE, supra note 37, and J. LADOR-
LEDERER, supra note 37.
41. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authori-
tative DecisiOI~, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 271 (1967).
42. Grubb & Booth, The Church and IntematiOllal Relations, 17 YEARBOOK OF
WORLD AFFAIRS 219 (1963).
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constitutive decision.43 A more striking phenomenon, one which attests
to the increasing complexity and resource investment required for ef-
fective intelligence operations, is to be found in the contemporary intel-
ligence corporation: private corporations that specialize in obtaining,
processing and marketing intelligence, not only for policy makers in
the market, but in the political arena as wel1.H
A traditional channel for the performance of intelligence opera-
tions has been the universities. The recent revelations, in the United
States, of government contracted research in a variety of different dis-
ciplines and the degree of interchangeability of university and govern-
mental personnel, have tended to obscure the persistent fact that effec-
tive processes have always turned to the skill pools of universities for
intelligence purposes. This natural search for the best talent has been
abetted, since the Renaissance, by the individual scholar's desire to be
"relevant," to participate in projects the results of which are quickly
adaptable and discernible in social process. To the extent that govern-
ment becomes aware of the utility of natural and social science pro-
cedures and skills in social control, and scholars become anxious about
their "relevance," the incorporation of the universities within the
governmental structure will be accelerated.
The traditional literature of international law has characterized
the Roman Catholic Church as sui generis, because it manifests state,
political order and political party characteristics in different contexts
and at different points in time. In its intelligence gathering activities
the Church employs the strategies customary for each of these par-
ticipant types. Where diplomatic representatives of the Vatican are
accredited, it maintains legations which perform intelligence activities
through the normal diplomatic processes. At the same time, the inter-
national hierarchical structure, from parishes throughout the world to
the seat of Peter's throne in Rome, serves as an enormous cell system
through which a stream of intelligence is gathered and processed. It is
not necessary to assume that the information deals with specific persons
or particular acts. The significant point is that aggregate changes in
perspective and behavior are immediately indicated by the experiences
of churchmen at every level of society. The Church has also utilized
the apparatus of special missions for intelligence gathering purposes.
43. See generall:y, J. COHEN & M. MINTZ, AMERICA INCORPORATED: WHO OWNS
AND OPERATES THE UNITED STATES (1971).
44. B. SMITH, THE RAND CORPORATION: CASE STUDY OF A NON-PROFIT ADVISORY
CORPORATION (1966) ; see also, D. PRICE, GoVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC
RELATIONSHIP IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 65 (1954).
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In a community which recognizes knowledge as a crucial scope
and base value, an increasing number of individuals will tend to
perceive themselves as participants in the shaping and sharing of
intelligence.
As the pattern of science-based technology moves toward uni-
versality, traditional careers are abandoned for careers generated by the
new knowledge.45 Whether the new skills are specialized to the
physical, biological or cultural realm, they reach out for more base
values with which to reward and extend their activities. Hence they
generate "policy scientists" who mediate between a specific group or
organization of specialists and the larger social environment. Begin-
ning as educational, scientific or journalistic managers or adminis-
trators, policy scientists become more actively involved in the policy
processes of every sector of society. This includes the power process
at every level; hence, it includes constitutive operations. Given their
origin in one of the knowledge specialties, it is not surprising to find
that careers include participation in the intelligence services, overt and
covert, of transnational as well as national bodies. Scientific reputa-
tions establish the individual in innumerable instances as a reliable
source of information about the past or of critical estimates of the
future. Transnational audiences are prepared to give respectful atten-
tion to his testimony and to recommend to others that he be accorded
full credence. Hence transnationally known figures are able to empha-
size the dangers of a world system unable to safeguard general security
and the probable gains of a more adequate system. They can often do
this in ways that stress their spheres of competence and thereby reduce
the likelihood that they will be dismissed as "mere propagandists."
B. Perspectives
The crucial considerations here concern the trends in demands for
intelligence pertinent to common rather than special interests, identifica-
tions facilitating or impeding the production and sharing of intelligence
for common rather than special use, and e%pectation patterns which
facilitate the exploitation of intelligence for common purposes. Trends
in these phases represent the skewered curves which are encountered
throughout the world constitutive process and which indicate the si-
multaneity of trends that move toward and also away from a world
public order of human dignity.
45. For the most comprehensive survey, see F. MACHLUP, sllpra note 10, at
377-400.
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There is a marked increase in the demands for expansion of a
world intelligence pool which can be used for common rather than
special interests. Thus the global development process emphasizes the
transfer and creation of technological intelligence centers in all com-
munities of the world. The so-called "brain drain," the centrifugal
process in which established intelligence centers tend to draw talented
personnel from peripheral areas and thus to increase their capacities at
the expense of the peripheries, is deprecated but not stemmed. It is
significant that where intelligence centers are concentrated in highly
developed technological communities, these communities regularly in-
sist that their production of knowledge is an endeavor in the common
interest and that knowledge, by its nature, is an inclusive human prop-
erty benefiting all mankind.
The growing demand in many quarters for the shaping and
sharing of intelligence on a global scale is in part nullified by other
demands that are generated in a divided and hostile world arena. It
may be, as is often said, that "science knows no borders." But scien-
tists do; and so do those who seek to employ their knowledge for
national security or for the exclusive benefit of a monopoly. Many
branches of knowledge require heavy capital investment; and this
typically comes, not from the scientist, but from others who have other
ends than enlightenment in mind.
2. Identifications
A number of skill groups prominent in the production of intelli-
gence are intensely identified with one another and with the fate of all
mankind. Eminent scientists and scholars have undertaken to con-
tribute to the common perception of man as a distinctive living form
whose destiny is tied in with a common environment. It is in-
creasingly regarded as inexcusably parochial for specialists of high
talent and devotion to the general map of knowledge to prostitute their
talents in the service of civil war within the species. However, it must
be recognized that as matters stand today, identifications with less than
inclusive units than all mankind continue with largely unabated vigor.
In particular, identifications with the nation-state and with business
entities operating nationally and internationally typically result in an
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intelligence priority for these composite participants rather than for
the whole of mankind.46
Class identifications characteristically stand in the path of effective
performance of the intelligence function. Where "intellectuals"-
clearly delineated enlightenment and skill groups-are distrusted by
other elite and rank-and-file members, elites may reject sophisticated
conceptions of the intelligence operation. In the United States, for
example, tension has frequently been generated between the intelligence
and operational branches of departments, the latter presenting a de-
mand for "facts" and showing impatience with any broader contextual
considerations or with tentative judgmentsY
In the most fundamental sense, intelligence, as any other decision
function, is an interpersonal activity and hence cannot proceed without
some minimal capacity for identifications beyond the nuclear self.
The self-image of the intelligence operator is complicated and
confused by the variety of activities properly included in the function.
It is, hence, no wonder that the public image is heterogeneous and
chaotic. At one end of the spectrum is the "spy" or the "informer"
whose motivations vary from dedication to venality.48 At the other
end is the research director and expert witness who speak with the
weight of authority and respected status. As the intelligence needs of
the world constitutive process are clarified, the image of the operators
will undoubtedly become more differentiated. In particular, places will
be found for competent persons who are so cognizant of the map of the
world social process as a whole that they come to conceive of them-
selves as servants of the common interest.
3. Expectations
The matter of fact assumptions about the interdependence of the
world social process will presumably be affected by the actual interplay
of individuals and organizations in every value-institution sector of the
world community. It would, however, be a mistake to allege that since
the "environment" is "objectively" interdependent, it will be so per-
46. Each of these identification patterns is, of course, supported by a network
of external sanctions and internal, inculcated, autopunitive mechanisms. Espionage
statutes and Official Secrets Acts, for example, support the prevailing state system
and reinforce the parochial syndrome. There are other more subtle factors which
continue to support this system of fractionated loyalty and hence restricted knowledge
sharing. The very concept of "expert" in contemporary society imports membership
in an exclusive group and concern for that group's unique base of power.
47. S. KENT, supra note 3; H. WILENSKY, supra note I, at 8-16; H. RANSOM,
supra note 18, at 6-7.
48. Some consideration of the complex role of the spy is found in R. WEST,
THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON (1964).
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ceived at any given moment or by any specific participant in world
politics. The sequence between an event in the environment and the
perception of that event as part of an interdependent world is no simple
straight-line path. It depends on the readiness of the responder and his
predispositions; and these predispositions include expectations about the
consequences in terms of value indulgence or deprivation for adopting
a comprehensive viewpoint.
The network of expectation patterns which affects the intelligence
operation is particularly complex, for intelligence is an activity in which
the individual psyche is the primary mediator. As a result, in crisis
circumstances, a variety of basic psychopathologies become extremely
significant factors on individual behavior and, derivatively, on the con-
stitutive intelligence function. The most obvious example is, of course,
latent paranoid tendencies which are intensified by crisis. Collaborative
intelligence activities become more difficult and internal processes
undergo stress. Fantasies emphasize short-range, rather than mid-
and long-range intelligence needs; and the entire expectation and de-
mand structure of the personality is reframed in an extreme dichtomi-
zation of political good versus evil. Even in periods in which the
general population does not perceive itself in major crisis, individual
crisis-ridden personalities often gravitate toward public or civil intelli-
gence activities and shape them to configure their own psychopatho-
logical needs.49
We have underscored the distorting effect of a world arena struc-
tured in hostile groupings. Individuals are rewarded who emphasize
suspicion and distrust, quite apart from any personal pathology. The
expectation of violence is the key factor in perpetuating the fundamental
structure of a world divided against itself.
C. Situations
Every situation in the world social process may become significant
for the intelligence process. Hence a comprehensive focus must go
beyond specialized structures and consider unspecialized but functional
intelligence arenas. It is convenient to deal first with intelligence se-
quences: gathering, processing and disseminating. We then single out
49. E. SHILS, supra note 15, at 77-104. The following essays in THE RADICAL
RIGHT (D. Bell ed. 1963) are also useful: Westin, The John Birch Society id. at
239; Lipset, The Sources of the "Radical Right", id. at 307; Lipset, Three Decades
of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, M cCarthyites and Birchers, id. at 373. The
tendency to equate obsessive secrecy with the so-called "right-wing" obscures the
fact that this is a political pathology much more closely concerned with authori-
tarianism than with specific value preferences: see generally, T. ADORNO THE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 840-42 (1950) ; F. ALEXANDER, OUR AGE OF UNWSON
221-27 (rev. ed. 1951).
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There are certain relatively clear customary constitutive prescrip-
tions that refer to access and to the lawful level of intelligence gathering
activities.
Since Grotius, unequivocal international doctrine has held that
the great sharable resources of the world are open to access by all
peoples in pursuit of lawful activities.50 Hence intelligence gathering
on the high seas by instrumentalities which do not interfere with other
lawful uses of the oceans are deemed lawful insofar as they do not pre-
cipitate noxious effects upon other users of the seas or upon protected
features of the public order of littoral states. A number of states main-
tain fleets of intelligence ships, and it is noteworthy that protests and
action against them have sought justification in claims of penetration
of the territorial sea or allegations of self-defense, but not in terms of
the generic unlawfulness of intelligence activities on the high seas.51
On the other hand, intelligence gathering by modalities creating dis-
turbance of normal lawful user are deemed delictual. This conclusion
derives, it may be cautioned, from the interference with normal lawful
user and not from the fact that the activity in question is intelligence
gathering. Thus, the erection of a permanent tower for intelligence
purposes in a customary sea lane would transform a lawful act into a
delictual deprivation of others' use of the high seas.
Comparable policies apply to the airspace above the oceans. While
such factors as velocity and traffic load affect the public order regula-
tion of airspace superjacent to the high seas, the normative regime for
use of the airspace for intelligence gathering is the same as that govern-
ing the seas themselves.52
50. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 747-51
(1962).
51. But see Butler, The Pueblo Crisis: Some Critical Reflections, 63 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMER. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 7 (1969), who conjectures that the North Koreans
made such a claim by implication in the Pueblo case.
52. See Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage il~ Conditions of Modern Conflict
in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (R. Stanger ed. 1962). But
see Falk, Space Espionage and World Order: A Consideration of the Samos-Midas
Program, id. at 45. See also P. QUIGG, OPEN SKIES AND OPEN SPACE, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATION, SENATE COMM. ON ASTRONAUTICAL AND SPACE
SCIENCES, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 463 (1961); Gal, Some Legal
Aspects of the Uses of Reconnaissance Satellites in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION (A. Haley ed. 1963);
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In regard to space superjacent to the territory of nation-states,
different factors come into play. The notion of territorial sovereignty
ad coelum et ad inferas has not been extended effectively beyond the
stratosphere. In part because of an inability to control surveillance
craft above a certain level, in part because of a shared perception of
common security needs, the lower reaches of outer space have been
assimilated, in regard to intelligence gathering, to the regime of the
high seas. Insofar as intelligence activities do not extend beyond
passive monitoring, they are considered a lawful use of an inclusive
shared resource. On the other hand, the sub-stratosphere superjacent
to nation-state territory is considered assimilated to its exclusive terri-
torial jurisdiction. It is not a shared resource and is not therefore
subject to the unqualified intelligence gathering activities of the high
seas and the lower reaches of space.
The international law of intelligence gathering within the terri-
torial confines of a nation-state remains a controversial subject. The
more traditional doctrinal view has been that intelligence gathering
within the territorial confines of other states constitutes an unlawful
intervention, under both customary and conventional international
law.53 In terms of the actual volume of this activity, however, the num-
ber of formal protests which have been lodged have been relatively
insignificant. This latter practice suggests a somewhat ambivalent
perspective upon the part of national elites in regard to such activities
and may indicate a deep but reluctant admission of the lawfulness of
such intelligence gathering, when conducted within customary norma-
tive limits.
Intelligence gathering within a nation-state by aliens is character-
ized nationally as the crime of espionage and is subject to national
criminal prescription and application. Despite the fact that every
nation-state prosecutes espionage, no systematic attempt has been made
to assimilate the activity to delicta juris gentium.54 The anomaly of
such an attempted assimilation would lie in the fact that all states which
Gabrovski, Reflections on the Juridical Problems of the Extra-Aeronautical Space and
the Reconnaissance Satellites, id. On the extraordinary technical capacity of such
reconnaissance techniques, see Klass, Keeping the Nuclear Peace: Spies in the Sky,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1972, at 7 (Magazine) ; Greenwood, Reconnaissance and Arms
Control, 228 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 14 (Feb. 1973).
53. See, e.g., Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (R. Stanger
ed. 1962); the peculiar limbo to which traditional international law consigned
espionage is well reflected in an early edition of Oppenheim: see 1 OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW §455 (3d ed. 1920).
54. The authoritative myth about the "lawfulness" of espionage and the lawful
subjection of apprehended spies to the death penalty contains a high measure of
sophistry. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 559-60 (1961).
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condemn espionage engage in intelligence gathering and many of their
own activities abroad could be characterized as espionage under their
own statutes. A further difficulty lies in the fact that the line between
lawful intelligence gathering and espionage is thin, and may, in fact,
ultimately be irreparably perforated by technological innovations. The
greater part of intelligence gathering consists of simply monitoring and
collating public statements made within a foreign state, in national and
regional newspapers, trade, professional and technical journals, govern-
ment department announcements, and so on.55 Collection from these
sources involves gathering activities whose situs of operation is difficult
to locate. A communication, it should be remembered, is not a discrete
event, but is part of a network of communicational patterns. With the
advent of the modern technology of communications, the entire world
community comprises one vast audience. In a technical sense, then, to
communicate with anyone determinate point of the globe is often to
communicate with all.
In the light of these considerations, the problem of delimiting
spheres and extents of lawful intelligence gathering within the terri-
torial confines of nation-states becomes somewhat more manageable.
The gathering of intelligence within the territorial confines of another
state is not, in and of itself, contrary to international law unless it
contravenes policies of the world constitutive process affording support
to protected features of internal public order. Activities which seriously
compromise the dignity of individual citizens, their privacy or personal
security, or involve the destruction of property are, of course, unlawful
no matter which decision function they attend. Such activities are,
however, stilI widespread adjuncts of intelligence gathering.
b. Processing
The advent of a technological civilization that relies increasingly
on credit and check rather than cash in the economy means that an
enormous amount of intelligence is produced in the course of ordinary
commercial transactions rather than as an intelligence operation per se.
Insofar as a monetary criterion is accepted as a valuation of events and
an indicator of more general perspectives and operations, the
aggregate technological memory of a society will increasingly retain,
in a semi-processed form, a clear recall of the prodigious range of acts
performed by specific individuals, as well as a record of a collective
valuation of its worth. A harbinger of this trend is already visible in
the intelligence gathering of national credit associations, whose activi-
55. See, e.g., S. KENT, supra note 3, at xviii-xix. For a different view, see
A. ORLOV, supra note 34, at 5, 12 (1963); P. LEVERKUEHN, S1tpra note 33, at 202.
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ties have been enormously facilitated by the cybernetic processing and,
in particular, storage techniques of a variety of other industries.56 And
a sound credit evaluation, it should be recalled, is not a purely fiscal
operation but rather a relatively contextual assessment of the subject's
"character" as well as of his "capital" and" [repayment] capacity."
As transnational activities increase and institutionalize, the atten-
tion focus of technological memory banks may be expected first to
become national and ultimately to approach universality. At least
initially, these trends will involve intense centralization and generate
comparable power consequences. At later stages a communication grid
that includes competent representatives of all significant territorial and
pluralistic groups may share processed intelligence widely.
In such a projection, intelligence gathering will tend to be as-
similated to intelligence processing. Prescriptions aimed at realizing
such policies as privacy and personal inviolability, which have been
heretofore primarily directed to data gathering, may not be shifted
promptly to regulate the processing sequence; hence, a significant in-
trusion into the zone of privacy may result. If, as has so often been
suggested, privacy is not only a pillar of our preferred public order, but
is also a key condition of cultural creativity, the consequences of lag-
ging adjustment can be the infliction of irreparable damage to civic and
public order. Unless special techniques of supervision are innovated,
it is probable that such fundamental doctrines as the right of privacy
will be eroded.
c. Dissemination
The conception that the dignity of every human individual includes
a right to participate in all value processes finds repeated expression in
contemporary international law. Such participation ultimately depends
upon relatively unrestricted access to pertinent intelligence by all who
seek it. In practice, however, these policies may conflict with other
equally relevant community goals. Under certain circumstances, group
security may depend on secrecy. Although this claim has been fre-
quently exaggerated by crisis ridden or self-serving personalities,57 its
soundness cannot be denied. At the other extreme, it is evident that
the unrestricted dissemination of intelligence may precipitate serious
56. See, e.g., C. ELLIOTT & R. WASUY, supra note 10; Salm, Automatic Methods
of Information Storage and Retrieval in R. GREENE, supra note 10; F. MACHLUP,
supra note 10, at 295-322.
57. See E. SHILS, supra note 15, at 77-104; H. LASSWELL, POWER AND PER-
SONALITY 39 (1948); Wolfenstein, Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders in
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIAUZED SOCIETIES: STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 155 (L. Edinger ed. 1967).
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deprivations in other realms of public order. Much intelligence in-
evitably touches upon the private lives and pursuits of individuals and
its dissemination is bound to have at least some adverse effects. Hence,
the most appropriate constitutive policy in regard to the dissemination
of personal information is that such findings receive no publicity unless
a substantial common interest will probably be served thereby.
Constitutive policies are as much concerned with the affirmative
as the negative problems of dissemination. We are aware of the im-
portance for our preferred world order of relatively unrestricted access
to pertinent, reliable and publicized intelligence under the control of
intelligence agencies. There are, however, no constitutive prescriptions
that expressly assure such dissemination. The United Nations c~nnot,
for example, compel a member-state to publicize, within its jurisdiction,
intelligence findings which the UN might wish brought to public atten-
tion within a given polity. Nor is the organization equipped to monitor
and appraise sub-disseminations by national elites of intelligence which
the UN releases for public consumption.58 This can be a serious hin-
drance to world order, since national elites will frequently decide that
their interests are maximized by distortion or total suppression of intel-
ligence incompatible with their particular objectives. This situation is,
of course, remedial. There is no major technical obstacle in the
creation of a United Nations Broadcasting Network, exploiting the rich
translation services already extant within the organization, and reach-
ing an inclusive global audience by means of satellite transmission.
Presumably, national elites will be hesitant about such a creation.
A factual situation of great importance is the "leakage" of com-
munications across state lines. Radio communications across state
boundaries are a frequent and relatively inescapable product of normal
infra-state transmission. Although the ITU has sought to allocate the
limited quantity of bands and wave lengths among adjacent states,
radio interpenetration frequently occurs in fact, and in many states is a
prime source of intelligence for the populace. Moreover, on numerous
occasions, nation-states create special foreign transmission services to
serve channels for their version of intelligence: the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., China, the United Arab Re-
public and Cuba all use radio as a key instrument of ideological com-
munication.59
In the aggregate, these activities serve to unify a global dissemina-
tion arena and hence to increase the quantity and quality of intelligence
58. See A. SZALAY & M. CROKE, supra note 23.
59. For range of activities, see W. DAVISON, $lepra note 4; L. MARTIN, supra
note 4; J. WHITTON & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA (1963).
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provided to rank-and-file consumers. Their lawfulness under prevail-
ing international prescriptions is, however, controversial. Because dis-
seminated intelligence has an important power potential, particularly
when it by-passes the ruling elite and reaches the public-at-Iarge, it has
been assimilated to propaganda by a number of claimants who have
affirmed the authority of constitutive prescriptions that characterize
the activity as unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of a state.60
The Organization of American States, for example, has adopted an
extreme position on radio intervention.61 It is also memorable that
the interests threatened by an unrestricted dissemination of intelligence
to all peoples everywhere were instrumental in frustrating the United
Nations' efforts to establish freedom of information as an unequivocal
international policy.62 From the perspective of the policies which we
have projected for a world public order of human dignity, all claims to
lock nation-states out of a grid of free international communications
must be deprecated as a special elite interest that is incompatible with
the inclusive common interest.
Elite attempts to restrict the dissemination of intelligence which
they have not processed to their own ends may be expected to continue
as long as elites persist in viewing their power interests exclusively in
terms of national components. Nevertheless the attempt to restrict dis-
semination will ultimately be frustrated by an advancing technology of
communications. The convergence of satellite transnational broadcast-
ing and the dissemination of cheap and small transistor receiving sets
seem to assure the ultimate establishment of a globally inclusive arena
for constitutive intelligence. As this trend becomes more apparent,
elites can be expected to resort to alternative methods of frustrating the
potential of free intelligence: acculturation, mind control and political
control of the content of communication.
2. Time Dimensions
In popular parlance, intelligence is conceived of as a quick op-
eration, whose effectiveness depends upon the rapidity with which
secrets are ferretted out, processed and disseminated to elite decision-
makers. There are, of course, circumstances in which the speed with
which the intelligence sequences are executed is a vital component of
the decisional utility of the information gathered. It is, however, im-
60. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2916 (xxvii) Nov. 9, 1972, and also Report of Comm. I,
V.N. Doc. A/8864, A/L. 6821.
61. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES arts. 15 16
but ct. Art. 3, 147 L.N.T.S. 69. ' ,
62. See L. MARTIN, supra note 4.
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portant to emphasize the temporal range of different intelligence
projects. In a world characterized by rapid change, whose minimum
goal may ultimately be the regulation of the tempo of change so as to
maintain a stable social fabric, the importance of projective intelligence
is enormously augmented. The "Five-Year Plan" for social and eco-
nomic development, with an implied, if not implemented projective
intelligence operation of commensurate duration, is now neither surpris-
ing nor exciting. We are growing accustomed to a plethora of multi-
disciplinary 30 year projections, and it is increasingly apparent that the
maintenance of a livable environment will require even more ambitious
future thinking. \Ve may expect projective intelligence for 100 year
periods and, ultimately, intelligence versions of the future which are
based less on forecasting conceptions and more on evaluating and fol-
lowing preferred policies and procedures for the reshaping of man and
his environment.
It is unfortunate that thus far projective operations have been
undertaken rather infrequently by official power agencies, despite their
vast resources and stable structures. To a disproportionate degree
projective thinking has been the preserve of private scholarship and
commercial research. Effective intelligence and effective decision-
making will obviously require major changes in official thinking, and
in particular a new incentive system within the bureaucracies of govern-
ment. A recent study confirms that
the orientation in the intelligence services is overwhelmingly
toward short-term estimates of future conditions and to de-
veloping the professional skills for this kind of work. . . .
In the Foreign Service and the State Department, the over-
whelming pull is in the direction of attending to immediate
problems, and taking the longer-run view is hardly en-
couraged. Even when a structure is created to supplement
this strong preoccupation with the problems of the day-for
example, the Policy Planning Council-the tendency of its
members is to immerse themselves in the dominating problems
of the present. This is where the rewards beckon, while the
products of long-range analysis are likely to be consigned to
dusty shelves.63
The described perspectives are obviously self-defeating if the necessary
projective intelligence operations are to be provided for.
The increase in the temporal span of projective intelligence op-
erations has been matched by a decrease in the time period during which
many activities are executed. The use of technology and cybernetics
have fractioned the time and manpower needs in much intelligence work.
63. K. KNORR & O. MORGENSTERN, POLITICAL CONJECTURE IN MIUTARY PLAN-
NING 44-45 (1968).
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The factors which condition temporal span and time perception in
intelligence activities, and more broadly, in the framing of intelligence
goals are deeply imbedded in personality and society. At a deep level,
basic cognitive conceptions of time and metaphysical notions of causality
of a given culture are pervasive influences on the temporal ambitions
of intelligence activities. A cultural system which entertains a linear
conception of time, for example, will presumably produce more sanguine
intelligence participants than are generated by a culture with a cyclical
notion of time. Similarly, a culture viewing man as a prime mover and
causa causans will turn more routinely to intelligence activities than a
culture with a cosmology in which man is a secondary actor. Per-
spectives about time and causality are also affected by socio-structural
factors within society. Speier, for example, suggests that political elites
who have derived, or perceive themselves as having derived, from a
persecuted group may be expected to plan further in advance than
groups with no personal history of counter-elite conflict.64 He also
hypothesizes that political class elites incline to more planning than do
vertically mobile or democratic elites. Wilensky suggests that the
critical factor in the duration of forward-intelligence planning is the
elite's perception of incumbency. "The frequent, routine succession of
leaders in stable democracies, while encouraging continuity of past
policy, may discourage long-range plans." 65 Aristocratic or political
class groups, on the other hand, will exercise a greater penchant for
forward-intelligence and planning. While Wilensky's hypothesis may
fit certain levels of official elite activity, it does not cover the broader
range of intelligence activities which proceed independently of official
power processes. Knorr and Morgenstern, for example, cite bureau-
cratic incentives as a factor affecting temporal perspectives within
official intelligence agencies.66
3. Structural Features
The effect of institutionalized structural patterns on human activity
is a critical factor in performance level. Some attention has been di-
rected to the problem of structural "pathologies" in information col-
lection. Drawing on a broad literature and wide empirical investiga-
tion, Wilensky isolates a number of organizational factors inducing the
failure of an intelligence sequence.67 An excessively hierarchical
organization in which rank is multiplied, delineated in detail and sub-
64. H. SPEIER, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE RISKS OF VVAR 448 (1952).
65. H. WILENSKY, supra note 1, at 121.
66. K. KNORR & O. MORGENSTERN, supra note 63, at 43.
67. H. WILENSKY, supra note 1, at 173-91.
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jected to the ascription of intense symbolic differences, tends to block
upward communication, to create horizontal loyalties retarding the
vertical sharing of information and to set recruitment and advancement
standards in terms of organizational compatibility rather than talent.
An organizational structure which induces specialization and inter-
departmental rivalry tends to parochialize intelligence foci and to
render intelligence a base of power for departmental maneuvering as
well as an output for the servicing of elite decisionmakers. When com-
petition becomes more intense, departments become reluctant to share
information and may produce irrelevant or misleading information.
Bureaucratic growth introduces other structural factors. As the
component units of an organization proliferate, the communicational
distance between intelligence functionaries and key policy makers in-
creases. As the spatial scope of the intelligence operation expands,
geographical allocations of responsibility impede appropriate functional
attention areas, for many problems which are defined as geographical
are, in fact, transnational value problems. On the other hand, centrali-
zation of intelligence activities deprives the operation of the necessary
fleshing-out in the inclusion of local field work. A broad gap between
the intelligence center and field gathering and appraisal can induce
intelligence fantasies, which barely approximate the actual conditions
that prevail.68
A number of detailed case studies of intelligence pathologies are
available, and these provide vivid demonstration of the fact that a
structural problem may result in total frustration of otherwise sound
intelligence. Thus, the attack on Pearl Harbor was anticipated by
field intelligence gatherers and skilled, but hierarchically low, intelli-
gence processors. Yet the absence of appropriate channels prevented
this intelligence from piercing the thick layers of bureaucratic dermis in
time to avoid or diminish the disaster.69 It is now reported that three
opportunities for a negotiated Vietnam Peace from 1964 on were still-
born because indirect communications from the government of North
Vietnam to the mid-elite of the United States Government were, for as
yet inexplicable reasons, not transferred, in turn, to President John-
son.70 In the Bay of Pigs debacle, interdepartment and infra-depart-
mental rivalry induced a reluctance to share information; inadequate
channels between field and center generated intelligence fantasies at the
68. Id. at 175.
69. R. WOHLSTETTER, PEARL HARBOR-WARNING AND DECISION (1962).
70. Cousins, How the U.S. Spurned Three Chances for Peace in Vietnam, LOOK,
July 29, 1969, at 45.
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policy apex.71 There is, of course, no perfect structure for intelligence
operations, but the Bay of Pigs and Pearl Harbor cases do indicate that
the more serious pathologies are remediable.
Since the aggregate world constitutive intelligence arena is neither
homogenous nor unified, broad general characterizations of structural
strengths and weaknesses cannot be drawn. Diverse component in-
telligence arenas display different strengths and weaknesses.
4. Crisis
During intercrisis periods in world affairs a variety of unques-
tionably lawful public order activities produce, as ancillary conse-
quences, intelligence about the behavior and plans of others. Even
when missions and legations operate under severe self-restraints they
cannot avoid acquiring rather precise factual data and assumptions
about the perspectives of their hosts. Diplomacy is a lawful instrument
of national policy and, as we have seen, one objective of diplomacy is
the sharing of intelligence. Sonar and radar navigational techniques
used by ships and planes cannot but produce intelligence data about
other participants, even though their primary objective is navigational
safety. Orderly movement and inclusive safety require that a variety
of activities in the shared resource environment be preceded by pub-
lication of rather detailed plans and intentions. The movement of war-
ships through certain straits, for example, or through an interoceanic
canal must be preplanned and prepublicized. Such activities necessarily
produce intelligence. The daily transnational movement of peoples for
business, social and tourist purposes yields a wealth of data about the
activities and plans of other nations. All of these primary activities
are lawful, yet they may produce as much intelligence as the specialized
national agencies.
The intelligence consequences of many of these ordinary activities
are normally tolerated as part of interstate exchange. Insofar as they
do successfully provide participants with realistic images of each other,
they act in some degree as a stabilizing influence. In periods of crisis
and intense distrust, however, intelligence is raised to a new power
premium. Many of these normal activities are restricted precisely be-
cause of their ancillary intelligence aspects.
The psychological effects of crisis become relevant. The most
recurrent response is a shift to intensive primary identifications with
corresponding increase of xenophobia and particular hostility to indi-
viduals associated with the adversary group. Concurrent with the
71. A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 233-66 (1965) ; T. SORENSEN. KENNEDY
294-309 (1965) ; H. WILENSKY, supra note 1, at 76-81.
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obsessive inclination to husband and concentrate one's own resources
for security purposes is an increasing difficulty in participating in
collaborative activities with the adversary. Hence prior patterns in
intelligence sharing which had formerly been assumed to be matters
of common interest are attentuated or terminated completely. The
activation of a crime of espionage is only one facet of such crisis re-
sponse and, in terms of aggregate social effects, may be relatively in-
significant. More important are the introduction of political boundaries
to the dispersal of scientific and technical knowledge and coercive or
persuasive restraints on the free exchange of fact and opinion within a
particular state. Restraints such as these, which may shade off into a
subliminal level of individual consciousness, can engender highly dur-
able changes on the global constitutive level as well as on the municipal
public order level.
Such crisis response is not necessarily irrational. Some par-
ticipants may indeed experience a short-run gain by depriving others of
intelligence data in their possession and by attenuating the regular ex-
change of goods and services. In an arena in which violence is com-
monly assumed to be the ultima ratio, the psychological changes en-
gendered by mobilizing a crisis response may be necessary preliminaries
to the development of the emotional capacity to apply violence to other
human beings. Hence official propaganda may accelerate or even
initiate the process to this end. In a very real sense, the disclosure of
certain facts-the nature, capacity and location of defense installations,
for example--<:an seriously shift the power relations between two
antagonistic participants.
In the perspective of the common interests of the world community,
the rational core of crisis response must be balanced against its pre-
dictably dysfunctional effects. The short-run value gain from termina-
tion or attenuation of intelligence and commodity exchange will con-
clude in a net loss for all participants. Even if it is not scientifically
demonstrable that the unrestricted exchange of values is a precondition
of their greatest net production, it is empirically verifiable that par-
ticipants, activated by the desire to maximize their overall value posi-
tions, will, under normal circumstances, engage in multivalue exchange.
The fact that in genuine crisis situations individuals may be forced to
employ violence and that crisis response functions as a form of psycho-
logical adrenalization should be balanced against the obvious fact that
crisis response will also increase the probability of escalating violence;
and it will, furthermore, decrease the capacity of elite and rank-and-file
members to investigate alternatives or even to think in terms of com-
promising or integrative solutions. Thus, it need hardly be added that
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in a free or open society, sustained crisis will erode the very essence of
freedom: in struggling for survival, free society moves toward the
garrison state.
The ultimate test of the degree of rationality of any aspect of crisis
response is the extent to which, in the given context, it contributes to
the genuine interests of the participants involved. The self-perceived
interests of individual participants must, of course, be distinguished
from genuine common interests as identified and appraised by an objec-
tive observer. Personal crises, such as tension between two naval
officers of different powers, may be perceived as globally significant.
It is worth emphasizing that a crisis need not be inclusive, global and
deprivatory for all participants. Some participants may view an im-
minent, violent shift of value-control as promising immediate rewards;
hence, they deliberately pursue crisis diplomacy. We do not forget
that value pursuits may carry psychopathological overtones. An indi-
vidual may unconsciously court self-destruction or a local politician may
seek to consolidate his municipal power by creating and sustaining a
transnational crisis. Moreover, participants who are genuinely con-
cerned to alleviate crises may fail to achieve an appropriate perspective
and may, through miscalculation, defeat their actual interest in crisis
abatement.
D. Bases of Power
1. The Role of Authority
The authority of community expectation is a potent asset in refer-
ence to intelligence, as to every exercise of power. As matters stand
today the scope of authority available to the various participants in the
transnational political process remains vague. The critical point is the
borderland between claims to inclusive and to exclusive authority.
Because inclusive intelligence gathering is a necessary technique for the
maintenance of international standards in every sector which affects
international life, it would appear reasonable to affirm that the balance
should weigh in favor of an inclusive constitutive intelligence gathering
competence.
Available case studies indicate that the trend in authority has
moved clearly in this direction. There is no instance in which a claim
of domestic jurisdiction has deterred the UN General Assembly from
demanding and gathering the intelligence available for investigation
which it decided came within Article 10 of the Charter.72 The prin-
72. For an evaluation of these claims, see generally, R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELoP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1963).
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ciple has been applied against great as well as small powers. Of equal
significance is the distinction which the General Assembly has drawn
between the gathering of intelligence on the one hand and the applica-
tive phases of decision on the other. In the Peace Treaties cases,73 for
example, the International Court of Justice ruled that actual decision
was not permissible, yet the General Assembly still condemned the de-
fendant states for their "wil£ull refusal" inter alUl, to submit relevant
information about human rights matters subject to international super-
vision.74 Trends in authority have not, unfortunately, been matched
on the control level.
A number of trends indicate an inclusive demand to obtain maxi-
mum intelligence for decision-making, but these trends are countered
by the coarchical division of power and loyalty in the global arena. An
inclusive demand for the divulging of information for legitimate de-
cision purposes is often contradicted by an exclusive demand to sup-
press the same information for asserted purposes of national security.
These demands are not, it should be emphasized, incompatible, for
clarified common interest can, in different contexts, either demand total
revelation or sanction the suppression of relevant information if the
appropriate policies are served.
The operational problem occurred in the Corfu Clumnel case.75
An officer of the British Navy, under orders, refused to testify in regard
to a document which the United Kingdom had classified, despite the
fact that the document appeared to be crucial to establishing the inten-
tions of the United Kingdom in the factual complex under adjudication.
The Court ultimately ruled that the necessary facts could be established
without reference to the document in question and may, indirectly, have
conceded the tenability of the United Kingdom's security claim.76
The most extensive inclusive demand for intelligence is found in
the "Rule in Parker's case." 77 Here an arbitral tribunal asserted as a
prerogative of inclusive decision the complete disclosure of all infor-
mation which might bear upon the case at bar. The Statute and the
Rules of the International Court of Justice set a somewhat lower stand-
ard and, as the Corfu precedent indicates, the Court is predisposed to
consider a claim of lawful suppression. But it is significant that the
Statute does afford the Court a number of sanctions which may be im-
73. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania
[1950] I.e.]. 65, 221.
74. G.A. Res. 1485 (V), Nov. 3, 1950.
75. Corfu Channel Case (Merits) [1949] I.e.]. 4.
76. Cj. D. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 84 (1939).
77. Parker Claim, Opinions (United States v. Mexico), General Claims Com-
mission 39-40 (1927).
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posed upon a party unlawfully suppressing intelligence relevant to
decision. The efficacy of these sanctions will depend, of course, on the
disposition of control in the specific arena in which they are applied.7s
The authority of international organizations for intelligence
gathering varies widely. In a number of areas, the Charter of the
United Nations imposes a mandatory demand upon member-states to
collaborate in certain activities with the organization. States with trust
jurisdiction, for example, are obliged to submit annual reports to the
Trusteeship Council and to participate in a variety of other intelligence
gathering activities relevant to their administration of the Trust Terri-
tory.79 The South \Vest Africa case, in which the General Assembly
ultimately terminated a mandate, originally granted by the League of
Nations, for persistent violations of the substance and procedures of the
Mandate,SO indicates that Mandates or trusts are conditional grants of
'international authority, whose continuing validity depends upon con-
formity to the standards set by the inclusive community. A breach of
such standards, inter alia, failure to conform to obligations in regard
to the crucial intelligence function, is vulnerable to severe sanction.
The South West Africa case,S! as yet only a seminal indicator of a
new trend, also points up the limited effectiveness of such inclusive
sanctions. The Republic of South Africa has not yet surrendered its
control over South West Africa. On the other hand, the repudiation
of the United Nations decision has undoubtedly increased the South
African government's problems of administering the territory and has
further isolated it from the international community.
Another example of an inclusive authority to compel the sharing
of intelligence is found in the Economic and Social Council's Commis-
sion on Human Rights.82 The already ambiguous authority of the
Commission as stated in the Charter and in its own Statute was further
obscured by the Commission's self-denying ordinance of 1947.83 The
more recent practice, however, indicates a steady retreat from the 1947
ruling and an increasing tolerance upon the part of the United Nations
to accept more compulsory intelligence gathering authority in certain
78. W. REISMAN, supra note 24, at ch. 11.
79. See, e.g., the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland, 118
U.N.T.S. 255 art. 5 (1) ; U.N. Charter arts. 79, 87.
80. G.A. Res. 2145 XXI, 28 October, 1966, confirmed in [1971] I.e.I. 16.
81. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) [1966] I.e.I. 4.
82. See U.N. CHARTER art. 68. For reference to the rise and fall of the auto-
limitation of this article, see note 83 infra.
83. Report of the 1st Session of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/259 paras. 21-23; Economic and Social Council Res. 75 (V).
HeinOnline -- 46 Temp. L.Q. 407 1972-1973
1973] THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 407
areas of human rights.84 The inchoate authority of the UN to gather
intelligence about human rights is, of course, coextensive with its secu-
rity powers, for in the Charter conception human rights and inter-
national security are integral.85
The authority of the General Assembly to collect intelligence is
coextensive with the major purposes of the Charter. Article 10 of the
Charter authorizes the Assembly to "discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of the present Charter." Such discussion
necessarily involves the introduction of intelligence relevant to the
matter under consideration. Indeed, one indirect function of the As-
sembly's activity has been the formation of attention foci for vast seg-
ments of the international elite and public.
The intelligence gathering competence accorded the Security
Council under the Charter exhibits a higher degree of compulsory au-
thority, but it is more conditional than that allowed the General
Assembly and considerably more restricted in scope. Article 34 of the
Charter authorizes the Council to investigate "any dispute, or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute." The maximum powers of the Council come into operation
when the Council formally finds the existence of a threat to or breach
of the peace or an act of aggression. Operating under this form of
action, the Council may demand the revelation of intelligence; under
Article 25, members are obliged to surrender such intelligence in com-
pliance with the Council directive. The dynamics of the Council pro-
vide a considerable sanction potential: the mere installation of a matter
on the agenda obliges a state to adduce sufficient evidence to justify its
removal.
In organized communities in which a high degree of authority for
the gathering of intelligence has been accorded to inclusive authorities,
the opposing interests in such activities are generally reflected in com-
plementary normative sets. A domain of privacy, of varying content,
is recognized and it may be breached in part only in conformity with
lawful procedures.8a Similarly, the recognition of a compulsory au-
84. Schwelb, Some Aspects of the Measures of Implementation of the Intemational
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1 LES DROIT DE L'HOMME 363
(1968). On May 27, 1970, the Economic and Social Council adopted a new procedure
for dealing with communications from private persons and groups alleging violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the procedure is not unam-
biguous, it includes reception of such communications and, in appropriate circum-
stances, the initiation of inclusive investigation. For a brief description, see 7 UN
MONTHLY CHRONICLE 47 (Number 6, June, 1970).
85. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the Ultited Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 A.J.I.L. 1, 5-13 (1968).
86. See H. GROSS, PRIVACy-ITS LEGAL PROTECTION (1964); A. HARRISON THE
PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE (1967) is an annotated biblioiraphy
providing a comprehensive survey of the literature. For European approaches, see
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thority to collect intelligence will often be tempered by a complementary
norm that forbids structuring processes in a manner that requires self-
incrimination. The latter is considered by many to be among the bed-
rock principles of human dignity. Many of the national doctrines re-
flecting the complementary aspect of international intelligence gathering
are traditional norms which have become tightly interwoven with
national myth and miranda. Hence they have manifested a striking
immunity or at least resilience to critical investigation and appraisal.
A consideration of the successive components of the intelligence func-
tion, for example, would indicate that the greatest concern is usually
with dissemination, and that, assuming appropriate safeguards, an in-
clusive interest might be accommodated in gathering, processing and
limited dissemination when genuinely inclusive community interests
are furthered. Such an interest could be adapted to the equally
legitimate demand to respect individual privacy and, ultimately, the
integrality of the individual personality. Here, as in many other areas
of public order inquiry, the failure to maintain a distinctive observa-
tional standpoint has bedevilled policy investigation.
Yet the persistence of the complementarity can be traced to a
continuing antinomy of interests in any community which simul-
taneously emphasizes the development of the individual ego and the
inculcation of a shared consciousness of group integrity and interest.
This normative balance poses the question, in ever changing contexts,
of how far, for what purpose and through what procedures the in-
clusive group may gather intelligence for its legitimate purposes and, in
obverse, what claims the individual citizen may make for the protection
of his privacy.
2. Distribution of Control
a. Power
Patterns of the allocation of effective power in the international
arena continue to favor exclusive over inclusive structures. In par-
ticular contexts, the dynamics of the process may accord a functional
power to an inclusive process for purposes of intelligence gathering, but
general trends continue to indicate a reluctance on the part of national
elites to share a significant part of their power with an inclusive organi-
zation for intelligence or for other decision functions.
The obvious application of power to intelligence operations is in
coercive release of the information necessary to political decision. In
S. STROMHOLM, RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PERSONALITY (1967). See
also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
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the diverse social and power processes in the international arena, dif-
ferent elites in different situations may enjoy such functional power.
The authoritative restraints operating on them will vary according to a
number of different factors. The point to be emphasized is that power
for intelligence gathering purposes is not the exclusive monopoly of
national elites or their authorized representatives. On the contrary,
national power is often most manacled with authoritative restraints. It
is frequently on the lower levels of social organization that other value
elites can command the release of intelligence by the exercise of threats
of severe deprivations which they are quite capable of imposing.
The extent to which naked power will be tolerated for intelligence
gathering purposes is determined to a large extent by the values of the
public order system involved, whether we are dealing with a terri-
torial nation-state, a political party or order, or a gang. Public order
systems which put a high premium on human dignity will presumably
attenuate the range of situations in which high degrees of coercion will
be used to secure the release of intelligence. The functional public
order values of a gang, on the other hand, which cultivate violence as
a creed in relation to others and as a blutkitt between gang members,
will resort to violence for intelligence, as for other decision functions,
more as a matter of ideology than of convenience. Gangs, whether
operating infra or interterritorially, or in charge of the apparatus and
symbols of a nation-state, illuminate a critical factor in the choice of
base value and strategy for intelligence collection: a preference for high
or low level coercive techniques may result from group ideology or
personal psychic disorder rather than from objective choice of the most
expedient strategy. The Nazis used violence rather than more
sophisticated and economic pharmacological techniques for getting the
truth because they were thugs, part of whose creed and motivation was
sado-masochistic.87
We have considered power as a base for the intelligence function
within a rather narrow temporal span. In broader perspective, the
sustained disposition of effective power has a much larger ramification
for intelligence purposes, for it permits elites to create predispositions
within the rank-and-file favoring the voluntary contribution of intelli-
gence to specified elite targets and internalizing in each personality a
value scale according to which the suppression of information is ex-
perienced as evil and triggers autopunitive measures. vVithin closely
knit kinship groups, such sharing of intelligence is a common feature.
A comparable impulse may be evolving within transnational skill groups
where invocations of professional loyalty seem to elicit a desire to share
87. Alexander, War Crimes alld Their Motivation, 39 J. eRrM. L. 298 (1948).
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intelligence or, alternatively, to suffer feelings of guilt if information is
suppressed from colleagues. This phenomenon will be considered more
fully in our discussion of affection and loyalty as bases of power. The
capacity of an elite to shape perspectives conducive to long-term in-
telligence exploitation is a function of power.
b. Wealth
The wealth available for intelligence has heretofore been primarily
at the disposal of nation-states. The increasing costs of global intelli-
gence suggest that the number of effective participants will be further
winnowed until only superpowers can maintain plenary intelligence
processes. This trend, itself, may accelerate intelligence collaboration
through international governmental organizations and stimulate states
to contribute segments of their intelligence budgets to inclusive organi-
zations in return for intelligence dividends. Private intelligence cor-
porations may become intelligence contractors, leasing their personnel
and plant capacity to different participants for specific intelligence
needs. 88 The seminal intelligence activities of the IAEA may be a
harbinger of future inclusive intelligence activities stimulated in part by
the limits of individual nation-state resources.
The capacity to mobilize wealth resources for intelligence purposes
has been an increasingly important base in this decision function. For
gathering sequences, wealth can be used to buy information or, in a
more subtle form, to secure its release by implications of the withhold-
ing of future wealth or wealth-dependent indulgences. In those cul-
tures in which wealth is accorded a high social premium, where "the
wealthy" equal "the good", wealth elites may find themselves the re-
cipients of information in a manner similar to religious contributions,
libations and so on. The role of wealth in intelligence gathering may,
however, be neutralized. For example, ideological loyalty, intense
rectitude demands within the personality, or psychopathological states,
may prove far stronger than the attractions of lucre. Yet it is signifi-
cant that veteran intelligence gatherers prefer a paid to an ideologically
motivated informer. The latter is believed to be less stable as a person
and therefore more susceptible to change of conviction. Hence it is
standard practice to put the informer who recruits himself on the pay-
roll, his protestations notwithstanding.
The significance of wealth is less visible but of equal if not greater
consequence in other aspects of intelligence gathering. The maintenance
of a vast network of communications for the timely perception of rele-
88. See Price's theory of "federalism by contract" in D. PRICE, supra note 44,
at 65.
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vant data and its rapid transmission to a processing center requires an
enormous continuing wealth investment. Since, in the view of many
observers, the deduction and synthesizing operations performed on a
mass of legitimately collected information are the more crucial parts of
intelligence when compared with the glamorous theft of documents,89
wealth plays an ever greater role than is ordinarily apparent.
The processing of intelligence has become an enormously tech-
nologized operation, requiring a vast and highly trained personnel force
with large and expensive plant facilities. 90 As the volume of necessary
information increases, as it must because the total focus of intelligence
in the future will have to be more continuously global and comprehen-
sive, greater reliance will perforce be placed on mechanical and cyber-
netic systems for synthesis, storage and retrieval. The investment
necessary for the maintenance of such systems will grow proportion-
ately. Presently we are witnessing only the beginning of this spiral,
yet its dimensions augur the enormity of the future investments re-
quired. In cryptography, for example, a state desiring even temporary
secrecy, must maintain vast batteries of computers for the rapid forma-
tion of new and more complicated codes as well as for the deciphering
of the current output of other states.
The role of wealth in the dissemination of intelligence varies with
the objectives of the specific intelligence participants and the targets
which they wish to influence. A small, proximate target requires the
maintenance of minimum channels. A global intelligence process, seek-
ing to inform the broadest and most comprehensive audience, requires
a vast and varied dissemination system. The need goes beyond main-
taining physical channels. A staff of personnel is required capable of
formulating the content of specific communications in terms compre-
hensible to chosen components of the global audience.
c. Enlightenment
The global stock of enlightenment is not equally dispersed but is
scattered in clusters around the earth. Large sections of the world
must still be characterized as an enlightenment wilderness almost
wholly out of touch with contemporary science. The concentration of
highly enlightened individuals in one sector does not, however, neces-
sarily mean that they are solely at the disposal of exclusive policies.
The inclusive community's potential draft on the aggregate world en-
lightenment pool is, in large part, a function of the perspectives of
89. See S. KENT, Sllpra note 3, at xvi-xviii; A. ORLOV, supra note 34, at 8-9 and
see p. 412 illfra.
90. F. MACHLUP, supra note 10; R. GREEN, supra note 10, at 3.
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enlightened individuals. If such individuals identify with transnational
objectives, the available knowledge may be adapted to the inclusive
needs of the global community.
Effective intelligence is often interfered with by exaggerated de-
pendence on particular skills rather than on comprehensive and con-
textual considerations. Persons close to the operational phases of an
intelligence process often tend to adopt a non-contextual view. General
Orlov of the U.S.S.R., for example, in a manual on espionage, claimed
that the core of the operation involved the infiltration of an agent who
would then steal or copy the documents or objects necessary.91 An-
other version is presented by Sherman Kent, who believes that the core
is the synthesis and evaluation of flows of data "bits," most of which
are acquired openly and legitimately.92 The two methodologies are not
incompatible, but it is clear that any intelligence operation, whatever
the strategies employed, must be conceived and interpreted with a com-
prehensive map in mind.
It is, as yet, difficult to identify specific personality attributes of
the greatest relevance to the intelligence function.93 In addition to
native endowment and broad education, all observers have emphasized
creativity as crucial. Psychologists have tentatively identified a num-
ber of aptitudes whose convergence seems to result in creativity and
there are informal indications that certain training techniques usually
improve creativeness.
Among the psychocultural factors affecting the acquisition of
knowledge is the willingness of a society to encourage some of its mem-
bers to use enlightenment as a base for further enlightment. In every
society there are impatient or anti-intellectual elements who have no
understanding of knowledge as a principal end and who reiterate the
importance of prompt instrumental pay-offs in terms of weapons,
wealth, health, or other value outcomes. It is no surprise that politi-
cians in certain localities try to project a self-image of reassuring
"folksiness" and to polemicize against the professional intellectual, as
an "egg-head" or "long hair."
91. A. ORLOV, Sltpra note 34. See also p. 395 supra. The difference between
Orlov and Kent which has been much discussed in the literature on intelligence was
probably overstated at the outset. Orlov's manual reveals that his conception of
intelligence is always wartime intelligence, whereas Kent's conception is considerably
broader. Kent does not rule out the value of the purloined document; he simply sets
it in a context of aggregate intelligence for strategic decisions, in which its value
shrinks considerably. On the war frame of Soviet intelligence, see O. HEILBRUNN
THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICES 49-55 (1956). '
92. See note 89 supra.
93. But see W. PLATT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES
249 (1957); S. KENT, supra note 3, at 180.
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The skills involved in intelligence operations have undergone revo-
lution and transformation. Efforts to clarify the goals of public policy
call on the techniques of contemporary logic to classify doctrine, for-
mula and miranda. The study of every territorial community calls for
earth scientists and historians to characterize the broad outlines of the
picture, and for appropriate specialists on each value-institution sector.
Hence, lawyers, political scientists, specialists in communication, econo-
mists, physicians, educators, sociologists, psychologists and many other
scientists of culture are involved. Competent specialists in the physical
and life sciences are needed to assess the environment in which arena
activities are carried on. As indicated before, the need of effective cor-
relation among scientists and the decisionmakers has led to the emerg-
ing policy sciences.
Intelligence gathering draws upon every conceivable type of skill
specialists. Some, such as survey interviewers, are quite overt. There
are, however, some operations that generate experts on stealth and
subterfuge. The differentiation of skills within the gathering and
processing of intelligence is so great that schools have been established
to supply competent talent. Some universities even offer courses in
industrial espionage. Industrial laboratories often devote themselves to
improved systems of machine recording and processing.
Some indication of the skills involved in even a legitimate and
overt intelligence operation can be gained from considering a hypo-
thetical Presidential Commission which has been directed to prepare an
intelligence report on the extent and causes of urban violence. The
gathering sequence may engage a variety of skills conventionally
associated with pollers, content analysists, historians, geneticists,
nutritionalists, demographers, physicians and so on. Processing may
involve the formulation of a special computer code, punching, com-
puting, reading results, preparing charts and so on. Analysis of the
data collected involves all the skill groups initially active in the formula-
tion and tentative identification of conditioning factors. And prepara-
tion for the dissemination of results requires a variety of new
techniques.
This example, which has been drastically simplified and shortened,
provides a rough indication of the range of skills involved in an in-
telligence operation directed at a specific facet of public order and not
at the infinitely more complex global constitutive process. If the skills
involved seem staggering, the shock should be tempered with the
realization that many of these competences are regularly employed in
the everyday credit operations of large American corporations.
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The unequal global distribution of intelligence-related skills favors
exclusive rather than inclusive results. Nevertheless a number of
trends point toward the growth of concern for inclusive interests.
Where transnational activities, thanks to their technical character, re-
quire transnational planning, inclusive intelligence structures emerge.
National assets are merged, forming an international skill pool for in-
telligence operations. As interdependence increases, this trend will
presumably accelerate.
e. Well Being
The capacity to perform any decision function is clearly dependent
upon a measure of physical and psychic health. Below a certain
threshold, the organism ceases to consider its environment in the
realistic terms necessary for a successful decision. Well-being also has
specific relevance for the performance of intelligence tasks. A mini-
mum level of mental health-the capacity to view the environment and
the self-system within it without intense neurotic or psychotic dis-
tortions-is crucial for the ultimate effectiveness of intelligence op-
erations. The still recent examples of Stalin and Hitler, who were
unable to exploit or at times even to assimilate the excellent and timely
information provided by their vast intelligence establishments, drama-
tize the relation between rationality and effective intelligence. Subtler
but more pervasive phenomena of this kind are the parochial national
and sub-national biases that affect perception and cut off imaginative
invention of policy alternatives.
Through history, a recurrent theory, in different forms, has con-
tended that the optimum intellectual state of mind is one which has
undergone deculturalization and has risen to a higher level of percep-
tion. This can be accomplished by Appolonian techniques of severe
self-discipline, as in the exercises of Zen, or by Dionysian stimulations,
as among the current apostles of psychedelic drugs. A variation, much
discussed by the romantic writers of the 19th century and forwarded
by such eminent artists as Thomas Mann in this century,94 holds that
illness performs the same function. The undeniable relationship be-
tween somatic conditions and psychic states remains to be fully ex-
plored.95 Recent research suggests that deprivation of proper nutrients
94. T. MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN (English trans!. 1927).
95. For one study, see R. MASTERS & J. HOUSTON, THE VARIETIES OF PSYCHE-
DELIC EXPERIENCE (1966). The entire area of the effect of drugs and more generally
nutrients on decision-making remains distressingly uninvestigated. In many cultures,
a variety of drugs are used regularly in stress situations and intensively in crisis.
Nicotine and caffeine, to cite only two common examples, may have wide-ranging
effects on metabolism, perception and response. Nor has there been investigation of
the possibly beneficial effects of a variety of other drugs or nutrients in different
components of decision sequences.
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from pregnant women and consequently from their offspring produces
children of limited mental capacity. The use of psychopharmaceuticals
as a means of increasing mental capacity is still in the infancy of ex-
perimentation. The point to be emphasized, however, is that insights
provided by such stimuli cannot be exploited unless the perceiver has a
frame of reference, including a clarified set of goals, in which the ex-
perience can be placed.
f. Affection
Affection and loyalties are frequently critical to the performance
of the intelligence function. On the personal level, the sharing of in-
telligence may be an extremely intimate and multiplely motivated
transaction. Physical seduction has been and continues to be a technique
of espionage. Ideological seduction, the persuasive transference of
loyalties from one public order system to another, is a recurring
historical phenomenon that appears whenever power struggles are in-
fused with clearly contraposed value systems. The ideological hero or
traitor is one who continues to profess loyalty to a group while
secretly transferring intelligence 96 to an adversary who commands his
true allegiance. Although our references to the phenomenon have been
in a context of interstate struggle, it is obvious on reflection that the
process may equally operate between exclusive units and the inclusive
global community, particularly in contexts where tension is perceived
between the interests of the world community and of particular states.
To the degree that loyalties follow family, ethnic or class lines,
these situations serve as a base for intelligence, often by means of threat
or blackmail. In public order systems which as a matter of policy en-
courage the family unit, prescriptions may seek to immunize intra-
familial ties from intelligence exploitations, by characterizing them as
privileged communications. Thus, spouse may neither be compelled nor
permitted to testify against spouse; in different systems, all or part of
the privilege may be extended to other family members. International
prescriptions have now guaranteed family integrality as a matter of
international right,97 and barring future changes in the conception of
96. This mixed status is a frequent feature of pluralistic societies and it can be
expected to increase in the future as identity systems extend to include loyalties to
a number of groups which may at times conflict. Terms such as spy, traitor and
espionage are highly emotive and are regularly used by members of contesting groups
rather than by observers. The matter is in need of urgent study. For one view
interesting because of the mixture of sympathy and revulsion, see R WEST, TH~
NEW MEANING OF TREASON (1964) .
.97. Convent~on on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Regis-
tration of Marriages, G.A. Res. 1763A (XVII) Nov. 7, 1962; Declaration of the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV) Nov. 20, 1959.
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the family institution as a protected public order feature, it is probable
that privileges comparable to those granted on the national level will be
extended in international law.
g. Respect
A respected intelligence participant maxImIzes his capacity to
gather and disseminate information. An intelligence gatherer reassures
his sources that data which they supply will be used for a defined pur-
pose and otherwise will be held in strict confidence. The credibility of
these assurances depends upon the respect enjoyed by the intelligence
collector. Whether the situation is a diadic micro-arena, such as
doctor and patient or psychoanalyst and patient, or broader arenas in
which an international organization seeks release of data held ex-
clusively by a nation-state, implicit understandings of trust and con-
fidence are crucial base values. A spy security crisis in one state may
lower the willingness of other states to continue to share defense in-
formation. Even the furnishing of data for an ordinary credit trans-
action is affected by confidence perpectives and will be retarded by
evidence of a probable breach.
Prescriptions can influence the flow of intelligence among par-
ticipants whose images of one another are vague or otherwise tainted,
by spelling out the precise nature of reciprocal claims, including modes
of recourse to obtain remedies for a breach.
The respect position of the intelligence-processor or disseminator
is of equal importance to those who perform the initial function. The
cues for respect vary according to the target audience and an efficient
service takes care to clothe the communication with the indicia most
appropriate to the recipient: dense footnoting for a scholarly group; an
unfootnoted and folksy presentation, perhaps ridiculing jargon, as a
means of appealing to an anti-intellectual audience; a quasi-religious
tone for dogmatists; and so on. A crucial component of the effective-
ness of an intelligence report may be the channels employed. In some
settings, for instance, radio-TV is more credible than newspapers, but
less credible than magazines or books.
Constitutive prescriptions can provide for special means to be used
to heighten the respect accorded to particular intelligence reports. For
instance, top level personnel and special sessions of government agencies
can be required to participate in the preparation and announcement of
five-year or other plans.
h. Rectitude
The impulse to share or suppress intelligence is compounded of
many factors. In particular, restraints of conscience may be critical.
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Rectitude in the form of self-vindication before the imagined bar of
history often motivates political memoirs and, on a day to day basis, is
probably a factor in much routine sharing of transnational intelligence.
During World War II Soviet intelligence operatives in Great
Britain, Canada and the United States were able to appeal to the sense
of injustice presumably being done to Russia by excluding an ally from
knowledge of new weapon developments, particularly in the nuclear
field. A regular feature of the political process is information leaks
originating with informed decisionmakers who are outraged by the im-
morality or irreligious policies under consideration by their own govern-
ments. As inclusive identifications increase, voluntary participation in
the global intelligence process will undoubtedly be stimulated by recti-
tude demands. It will be intolerable to the consciences of many
scientists and other men of knowledge to stand aside while their nation-
state or political party perverts science to destructive purposes.
Such opportunities are likely to be seized and encouraged by
priests, ministers and rabbis who are full-time specialists in the cultiva-
tion of ethical and religious belief and conduct. Institutions of recti-
tude have always been latent or overt enemies of the elites of power;
hence, the extraordinary ruthlessness of the measures that have so often
been taken by secular authorities to reduce the devotees of rectitude to
the status of a compliant instrument. Today it is recognized among
many ecclesiastical groups that they have no future save as recognized
servants of universal man.
If constitutive prescriptions are too weak to provide protection to
conscientious informers, they nevertheless may gradually gain from the
example provided by men of conscience who defy parochial loyalty.
E. Strategies
The strategies by which intelligence is gathered, processed and dis-
seminated are adapted to the requirements of those for whom the op-
eration is carried on, and to the circumstances to be utilized or overcome
in executing the complex tasks involved. A principal problem of the
world constitutive process is how to encourage the strategies capable of
delivering the results adequate to decision without transgressing the
limits appropriate to a preferred system of public order. A recurring
issue is the degree of coercion to be tolerated. In nation-states where
human dignity is taken seriously the general norm appears to be that
neither public nor private coercion shall be used save in exceptional
circumstances. When the intelligence sought is of great importance for
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public policy it is permissible for public authorities themselves to use
coercion, with procedural safeguards, to obtain the information needed,
or to block the access to information of those who seek to employ it for
impermissible purposes. In the transnational arena trends are moving
in the same direction insofar as prescriptions are concerned. Little,
however, has been done to bring about effective, inclusive application.
1. Gathering
a. Military Strategy
The use of armed force is severely limited by conventional and
customary international prescriptions. Hence presumptions against its
lawful application to intelligence gathering are obvious. Yet closer
analysis of actual tolerated practices indicates that compulsive and
coercive techniques of intelligence gathering have been deemed lawful
where other critical constitutive policies have received appropriate com-
pliance. In theory, the compulsive powers of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, operative upon a finding of a threat to the peace, could be
applied to the gathering of critical intelligence and could, moreover, be
delegated to another international organ or to a state for the same
purpose. In conventional Charter terms, the General Assembly could
not ordinarily impose the same degree of compulsion, but in practical
terms, it might in certain contexts dispose of sufficient authority and
control to create a compulsory intelligence gathering process. In com-
parable manner, regional organizations might dispose of enough au-
thority and control to engage in compulsive intelligence operations. An
organization, such as the ILO, while not resorting to the military
strategy, has a wide sanction at its disposal for requiring the release of
intelligence which it believes to be within its statutory jurisdiction.98
National courts, when seised with international cases, become functional
international decisionmakers and will apply a wide range of compulsive
intelligence gathering techniques, for which they are authorized under
their own nationallaw.99
The fundamental international policy of the lawfulness of com-
pulsive intelligence gathering is clearly presented and applied in the
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel
case.100 In that case, British warships had sustained damage with crew
injuries and deaths, while proceeding in innocent passage through the
Straits of Corfu. Subsequently, British ships swept the straits and
98. See generally E. LANDY, supra note 31; E. HAAS, supra note 31, at 245-52.
99. W. REISMAN, supra note 24, at ch. 17.
100. [1949] I.e.]. 4.
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seized a number of mines which had been laid there. The purpose of
the British sweeping operation was two fold: to clear the straits so that
innocent passage could be made and to collect evidence establishing
Albanian responsibility for the mining. When the case was brought
subsequently to the International Court of Justice, the lawfulness of the
British mine sweeping was challenged. The Court held that the
United Kingdom's action was an infringement of Albanian sov-
ereignty, but it refused to impose any further sanction upon the United
Kingdom, other than the verbal rebuke of the judgement. The Court
did not, however, deem the mines which the United Kingdom had un-
lawfully swept inadmissible as evidence. On the contrary, it relied upon
the evidence of the mines and based a number of factual conclusions
upon them.
The Corfu Channel case cannot be invoked as a precedent for the
proposition that the coercion level of intelligence gathering activities
for authoritative decision is not a component of its lawfulness and is
not a criterion in the ultimate admissibility of the intelligence gained
before authoritative decisionmakers. But considered in the light of
other judicial dicta and general international law's present halting re-
sponse to exercises in coercion, it may be stated that the mere fact of
coercion will not invalidate the admissibility of international intelligence
before authoritative decisionmakers. Coercion like all other facets of
the case will be given a contextual and goal-sensitive relevance and
conclusions as to the admissibility of evidence will be drawn in terms of
these factors rather than in terms of coercion alone.
On the national level, the employment of coercion as a means of
acquiring intelligence is verbally condemned as an intolerable infringe-
ment of human dignity, but in a large number of states, such coercion
is regularly practiced, if not with the complicity of authoritative struc-
tures, then at least in the absence of any authoritative checks. Pre-
sumptions of innocence and barriers against self":incrimination are a
relatively rare feature of contemporary national processes. The use of
physical and psychological torture as a means of extorting evidence is
prohibited by a number of international conventions 101 and cases of
official use of torture have been corroborated and condemned by re-
sponsible private associations. Yet there is no question that the prac-
tice continues and that it is becoming more sophisticated and insidious
as neural-electric and pharmacological techniques are adapted and
employed.
101. Article 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
Dec. 10, 1948; Article 3, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, May 5
1W~ ,
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The gathering of intelligence through the sifting and distilling of
communications between rank-and-file members is an ancient tech-
nique. Spies and informers always monitor the gossip of the market
place, the forum and so on, for indications of popular perspectives and
even more detailed knowledge. In crisis times it is routine to censor
private correspondence and to obtain indicators of the state of morale
among all layers of the population. Clues may be found that point to
conspiracies against public authority. In times of crisis elites regu-
larly exhort the populace not to speak of any matter which might have
security significance since "the enemy has long ears."
With the advent of systematic communications analysis at the
beginning of the 20th century, the ideological medium became one of
the more fruitful sources for intelligence of all types. Manifest and
latent content analysis of the communications of popular culture now
provide a regular source of knowledge in regard to almost all value
processes. Local authorities attempt to block the sending of publica-
tions abroad that would reveal information about the changing levels
of disaffection. Hence a problem for future prescriptions is how to
keep open the channels for obtaining ideological intelligence.
c. Diplomatic
The gathering of intelligence on the elite level, through small group
contacts, diplomatic intercourse, spies and more recently international
bureaucrats, is a continuous process which is ancillary to almost all
elite contact. Its volume is proportionate to inter-elite associations; as
these increase in every value process, the gathering of intelligence by
the diplomatic mode can be expected to expand.
The techniques for extracting information on the person to person
level have become extremely refined. Personal interviews and par-
ticipant-observation are considered legitimate modalities. There is,
however, a shadowy world in which promises of indulgence to indi-
viduals are employed to persuade them to part with information or to
recruit themselves in an intelligence network. Less fortunate indi-
viduals of the contemporary world, such as refugees and displaced
persons, are extremely vulnerable to blandishments of security in return
for intelligence services. It is doubtful whether any effective pre-
scriptions are presently available to restrict the use of coercion against
individuals who are believed to possess information.
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d. Economic
It is generally recognized that a transnational economic activity,
whatever its scope, necessarily obtains intelligence about much more
than economic conditions; hence, the resistance of nation-states to
foreign owned or controlled corporations. From the standpoint of
world inclusive intelligence it would appear that whatever encourages
transnational economic operations is likely to generate important grist
for the mills of public policy.
2. Processing
The most radical changes which the development of technology
have precipitated on the performance of the intelligence function have
been felt in the processing sequences: in the storage, retrieval and inter-
pretation of data which has been gathered. The limited number of
cross-filing methods which were used until the recent past were com-
paratively crude and cumbersome and limited maximum exploitation of
data which was available. Either retrieval was too slow or the organi-
zation of the processing sequences did not allow for comprehensive
syntheses of raw intelligence. Refracted and non-comprehensive con-
ceptual models also impeded the requisite contextuality of perception.
Primitive processing techniques often precluded the use of intelligence
which had been gathered but which was, in effect, operationally in-
accessible or the integration of existing intelligence into a comprehensive
picture. There are innumerable examples in a variety of value
processes of defective interpretation and consequentially mistaken plan-
ning because relevant value processes were not considered in the
projection of probable future trends.
The development of operational cybernetics has revolutionized the
processing of intelligence. Microfilm and computerized storage banks
have liberally extended the quantity of intelligence data or "bits" which
any intelligence process can draw upon at one time and the future
possibilities appear to be virtually unlimited. At the same time, new
groups specializing in intelligence processing have grown rapidly. In-
telligence servicing industries seem to have reached a take-off point;
the interaction between these specialists and the industry stimulates
continuous appreciation of operational problems and the invention of
new methods.102
There has been a comparable improvement in the comprehensive-
ness of focus in intelligence processing. Whether the focus is upon a
102. A collection which well illustrates this trend is R. GREENE, supra note 10.
See also C. EllIOTT & R. WASLEY, supra note 10; The Flow of Scientific Research
InforlllatiOl~ to !I~dustry, OECD Observer, April, 1964 at 12.
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credit rating or a report of a Presidential Commission or Royal Com-
mission or of a regional commission of the United Nations, one ob-
serves a tendency toward functional equivalents of comprehensive
phase and value analysis.
There are, to be sure, quality gaps in the processing of intelligence
at all levels of social process. Matters as fundamental as the question
of which communications to document and how to document them have
not been resolved; as the institutional structure of the world community
changes over time, problems of this sort will continuously reappear in
different guises. There are also periodic squabbles over comprehensive
contextuality as opposed to more refracted foci or to aggregate methods
of compilation and interpretation of social intelligence. And as new
quantities of intelligence are processed, load capacity problems recur. lOS
From the global constitutive perspective, the most deficient past
trend-and one which must be projected into the foreseeable future-
has been the geographical inequality of intelligence processing capaci-
ties. A striking contrast in the world arena is between technological
communities, on the one hand, which have proceeded so far in the
gathering and processing of intelligence that the problem which they
encounter is one of policy, the narrowing domain of privacy, and, on
the other hand, technologically underdeveloped communities in which
such minimal information as a head count is not available. As global
interdependence increases, this imbalance will ultimately prove to be
detrimental to planning on the part of even the most developed com-
munities, and will give greater impetus to the sharing of processing
technology.
3. Disseminating
The strategies of dissemination relate to the modalities by which
processed intelligence is conveyed to the attention of participants in-
volved in the performance of all other decision tasks. These operations
are primarily diplomatic or ideological, in the sense that they concern
communication to restricted elite groups or to the broad rank-and-file.
In a less visible manner, the military and economic strategies may be
integrated in different sequences of dissemination. Force may, for
example, be used in securing the instruments of popular dissemination;
standard procedure in coups d'etat is seizure of the national radio sta-
tions.104 As a political strategy, a new regime may open the hitherto
closed archives as a manifest political strategy, as the Bolsheviks
claimed they were doing in 1919. Similarly, access to bases of wealth
103. K. DEUTSCH, supra note 1, at 214-44.
104. E. LUTTWAK, CouP D'ETAT: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK (1969).
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may permit a disseminator to print leaflets or newspapers or to mount
jamming transmitters as a means of blocking broadcasts from other
countries.
A fundamental constitutive goal, as we have noted, is the maxi-
mum possible dissemination of intelligence to all participants who may
be affected by its use. The physical means for achieving this scale of
dissemination are unquestionably available. The global network of
communications via satellite radio and television links as well as the
more traditional forms such as the mass press are capable of bringing
an adequate flow of processed intelligence data to the attention of every
individual in the world. The quantity and quality of actually delivered
intelligence fall below constitutive goals for a number of reasons.
National elites have maintained close control over the intelligence flows
available to the masses. It should be noted that the great news agencies
of the world are national agencies which frequently propagate national
biases.105
The sequential position of dissemination as the last of the com-
ponents of the intelligence process should not be interpreted in the most
trivial chronological sense. Many of the most important infrastruc-
tural features of the dissemination process are consciously established
long before they are used as conduits for the actual dissemination of
intelligence; hence, the subtle but enormously important role of educa-
tion in the intelligence process. Learning is, of course, an ongoing
process which is never monopolized by a single institution. Yet the
official institutions of education, which can require (with official sanc-
tion) the presence and conformity of vast segments of the population,
do present an authoritative "map of reality" for the young. Obviously,
the educational process is a crucial base of elite power and an extremely
effective point for influencing the intelligence function. There is no
indication that national elites have failed to utilize this institution as a
base of power and a strategy of dissemination.
F. Outc01nes
The most conspicuous trend in intelligence outcomes is that of a
proliferating abundance in the gathering, processing and dissemination
of information. Thus, the "planning" function has become ubiquitous
at all levels of government-local, national, and transnational-and
throughout the increasingly pervasive and transnational network of
private associations dedicated to the shaping and sharing of all values.
Though in many of these institutional contexts provision for the plan-
ning function may be more symbolic than real, in the sense that per-
105. T. KRUGLAK, THE Two FACES OF TASS 7-20 (1962).
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formance falls short of promise, there is in fact much more effective per-
formance of this function, indispensable to all rational decision, than ever
before. Happily, because of the contemporary technology of communi-
cation and advances in the education of peoples, this accelerating
ubiquity in the performance of the intelligence function characterizes
even its dissemination phase. There are more students, newspaper
readers, radio listeners, television watchers, and aware community
members than heretofore, and the popular attention focus in the many
diffuse localities about the globe has become increasingly inclusive.
The wide perception of the interrelation of phenomena has, per-
force, rendered intelligence gathering a global operation requiring more
institutional and ad hoc cooperation across political boundaries. No
decisionmaker who hopes for any degree of effectiveness in decision
can today conceive important problems in merely national or regional
terms, without taking into account the more comprehensive processes
of the earth-space arena. There seems to be a general trend toward
increasing comprehensiveness in focus and, despite a number of struc-
tural pathologies, an increase in the availability of intelligence to
decisionmakers at different hierarchical levels. Most important, the
United Nations, with all its internal bureaucracies, and the host of
specialized agencies and regional organizations, whose principal man-
ifest competence is that of intelligence, have brought a hitherto un-
imagined inclusivity to the gathering, processing, and dissemination
of information. It must be acknowledged, however, that the dis-
semination or communication of intelligence does not always attain
appropriate degrees of inclusivity. Too many participants in the
global process continue to regard the information they gather, though
of inclusive import, as their national or private property. The con-
sequence is that many decisions of inclusive, constitutive or public
order impact are still taken on incomplete intelligence or unrealistic
grounds.
The dependability of intelligence, which varies almost as widely
as its comprehensiveness, seems to be a function of public order and
value structuring rather than geography. Where intelligence has be-
come politicized or is a component of a garrison state trend, depend-
ability has suffered. Where intelligence producers have insulated
themselves from these conditions, dependability has increased.
Relevance appears to follow the same pattern: "Who pays the
piper calls the tune." Insofar as elites have set intelligence goals either
for the entire public order or for specific sectors, intelligence outcomes
have configured their special interests and only indirectly or coin-
cidentally the preferred goals of an optimum public order. A signif-
HeinOnline -- 46 Temp. L.Q. 425 1972-1973
1973] THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 425
icant counter-trend has been, as noted, the tendency of intelligence
specialists themselves to organize against such elite pressures and to
attempt to police relevance within the knowledge establishment.
The most varied outcomes have been achieved in relation to open-
ness and availability, particularly as concerns the dissemination phase.
Trends in terms of these criteria resist any single analysis. The phase
of dissemination, as we noted earlier, represents a complex flow of
events in which a variety of different participants and structures inter-
act. From the moment of retrieval of processed data to the moment
when it is delivered to a specific consumer, successive operational and
intelligence choices are made which may ultimately affect the target,
modality and substance of dissemination. While conscious and un-
conscious political motives may influence decisions about dissemina-
tion,106 it is important to emphasize that a great many dissemination
choices, no matter what their political effect may be, are taken for man-
ifestly non-political reasons.
The examples of this mechanism are abundant. Some informa-
tion may be routinely discarded as insufficiently important to merit
elite consideration. Technical limitations may render the communica-
tion of some data difficult or impossible. A newspaper which publicly
commits itself to publish all the news obviously cannot do that because
of time and space limitations; it will, perforce, suppress some material
which has already undergone processing and has undoubtedly affected
the perspectives of those individuals involved in that segment of the
intelligence process. Or an intelligence agency may labor under a
directive from the executive apex which it serves, insisting that all
communications be no more than two page memoranda composed in
only bisyllabic words. Or the quantum of relevant intelligence may so
far exceed the load-capacity of the channels carrying it to elite targets
that its delivery must be indefinitely postponed.l07 In all of these
examples, the functional suppression of processed intelligence is caused
by structural features of the intelligence operation rather than by con-
scious decisions to suppress for specific value reasons. lOS
Decisions to suppress some processed intelligence presuppose au-
thoritative expectations about the audience appropriate for intelligence
106. See, e.g., A. ROWSE, ApPEASEMENT: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DECLINE (1961).
107. See Speeckaert, Methods of Dissemination of Results Achieved iI~ the
Activities of b~ternational Organizations, 16 Int'l Assoc. 398 (1964).
108. R. :MERTON,l. SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, (rev. ed. 1957);
T. PARSONS & E. :::'HILS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION (1951). Any
consideration of intelligence draws attention to subtle dimensions of "structure",
whose importance is less evident than in other areas. The comparative structure of
languages, for example, can affect dissemination in a number of ways, as can the
cognitive maps which are acculturated at early phases of development.
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products. We are not concerned here with the delineation of a
catalogue of constitutive claims to suppress or restrict the dissemination
of intelligence products, but rather with suppressions which either re-
flect structural pathologies of the intelligence process or are indicative
of unlawful manipulations of knowledge to secure other values.
In certain institutions demands to disclose intelligence and sanc-
tions for suppression are stated in highly explicit form. Yet in each
value process the policies actually made effective are ultimately incon-
sistent. Consider the shaping and sharing of wealth. In theory, in-
sider information is not to be used until it has been made available to
the general investing public. At the same time, there is no sanctioned
general prescription for the free interchange of information relevant to
the wealth process, despite the fact that the assumed effectiveness of a
free market economy is based upon such unrestricted interchange. In
fact, much information of public consequence has been invested with the
character of "private property" and private efforts to discover it are
considered forms of business espionage. Authoritative attempts to
police intelligence data which should be publicized must work through
a network of tortuous delictual concepts, which have been rendered
obsolete by the techno-communicational revolution and the restructur-
ing of the contemporary consumer market.
Parallel inconsistencies are found in the express and customary
prescriptions regarding .intelligence dissemination in other value
processes. In the affection process, for example, cultural ethics set a
high premium upon the free interchange of ideas and information within
the family circle. On the other hand, public order prescriptions impose
sporadic sanctions upon inter-familial and inter-conjugal suppressions.
In the skill process, it is now accepted that the technician will suppress
technological advances which he has innovated in order to maximize
his position as opposed to that of management. Despite the obvious
common interest in the sharing of such skills as a means of maximizing
the production of goods and services, class and strata tensions create a
climate of distrust sufficiently strong to support a practice of intelligence
suppression detrimental to optimum community process.
The policy and practice of intelligence dissemination in the power
process has many dimensions. Within formal structures, an intelligence
agency or department is not authorized to suppress intelligence which
will be of possible use or interest to the elite which it serves. Sup-
pressions do, nonetheless, take place under a variety of disguises. De-
partmental rivalry, personal ambition, a self-censorship aimed at pleas-
ing rather than serving an elite can motivate suppressions. Suppres-
sions may take the form of routine sidetracking, or low-priority rating
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which indefinitely postpones investigation, and so on. On a more
manifest level, a formal intelligence organ will be most reluctant to
divulge information about itself and its operating procedures to another
coarchical or hierarchical organ charged with appraising its activities.
Such suppressions, justified in terms of group security and the con-
tinuing efficaciousness of operating procedures, act as a major bar to
appraisal and to effective inclusive control of intelligence activities.
The most persistent challenge to a democratic world public order
in the performance of the critical intelligence function does not lie in
the partially remediable structural pathologies of intelligence dissemina-
tion. It is, rather, found in elite suppressions of intelligence which,
according to general expectations of authority, should be made available
to broad segments of the rank-and-file. Where the general constitutive
process has established effective participatory roles for all individuals,
the intelligence function includes the unrestricted dissemination of the
intelligence to the population at large. If those responsible for the final
step block dissemination, then intelligence is being used against con-
stitutive policy and with widely permeating consequences for the
sharing of power.
Statistical documentation of the degree to which the intelligence
slated by constitutive policy for unrestricted dissemination is or is not
actually disseminated presents major operational problems. A variety
of indices are, of course, available. But the ultimate contextual evalua-
tion calls for an assessment of intelligence output in terms of the
appropriateness of the presentation to the intellectual level of the
audience. As noted earlier, when the audience is incapable, by reason
of internal personality structuring, socio-political self-perception or lack
of minimum enlightenment and skill, of absorbing or acting upon re-
ceived intelligence, the act of dissemination becomes a ritualized
caricature of effective power sharing.
Disseminated intelligence which is delivered to effective decision-
makers does not dictate a certain choice. Accepting the goals of the
community in question, the intelligence function provides contextual
detail and the probable consequences, in terms of aggregate value gain
and loss, of alternative courses of decision. Thus, the question whether
decisionmakers adopt the intelligence reports which they receive is a
misleading question. If they receive the report and acquire some fur-
ther insight into the decision alternatives facing them, a minimum goal
of intelligence will have been realized. Adoption of one of the alterna-
tives suggested by the intelligence function is, of course, pleasing to
intelligence functionaries, and some instances of adoption provide the
necessary feedback to intelligence personnel, assuring them of the
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political reality of their labor. Yet it must be emphasized that rejec-
tion of an intelligence recommendation does not signalize the failure
of the intelligence function. As an intelligence specialist put it:
The intelligence consumer who has been close to the problem
of the producer, who knows it inside out, may have an
insight denied the producer. His near view of the broad
aspects of the problem and his remoteness from the fogging
detail and drudgery of the surveillance or research may be the
very thing which permits him to arrive at a more accurate
synthesis of what the truth is than that afforded the product.10(l
III. CONDITIONS
The real test of the effectiveness of the intelligence function, what-
ever the community, is of course in its contribution to the more rational
performance of the other six functions. The full ramifications of this
dependence at the global level will be examined as we consider, in de-
tail, each of the other functions. For the moment it suffices to note
that increases in the flow of intelligence, conforming to the criteria ap-
propriate to such an output (dependability, comprehensiveness, and so
on), have greatly affected promotion, prescription, and all the other
components of decision.
Conversely, how the various other decision functions are per-
formed has important consequences for the quantity and quality of
intelligence. Promotional activities tend to seize upon particular in-
telligence findings and to give a distorted picture of reality by dis-
seminating them further as a means of adding plausibility to par-
ticular demands. Often the over-emphases fostered by one promotional
campaign are corrected by other campaigns conducted by opposing
interests. But it requires an exceptionally firm faith in an invisible
hand to believe that during limited periods of time the play of com-
petitive forces is so finely adjusted that the waters of fantasy are
squeezed out of significant communication flows. Successful promo-
tions affect policy objectives and boundaries of credibility. Hence
intelligence operations are expected to serve modified purposes and to
win the confidence of committed official and unofficial groups.
When successful promotions culminate in prescriptions, the frame
of reference in which intelligence operations are carried on is more
permanently defined, and challenges carry more risks to the challenger.
Prescriptions include not only norms but expectations about the con-
tingencies to which they refer; and since norms are usually enacted and
accepted with concrete instances in mind, intelligence operations cannot
109. S. KENT, supra note 3, at 203-04.
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proceed to interpret otherwise ambiguous language with impunity.
Norm and contingency co·mponents of a prescription are also associated
with sanctioning provisions and expectations. Problems of enforce-
ability complicate the task of intelligence suppliers.
In the wake of accepted prescriptions follows a series of activities
that burden and rearrange intelligence tasks. Contending parties or
uncertain officials invoke prescriptions in concrete circumstances, and
expect to obtain pertinent and often claim supportive detail from the
services. At the application phase intelligence organs are expected to
operate with more definitive statements. Every new prescription is
likely to include some problems of termination as well as appraisal.
Given the multitude of specific requirements with which intelli-
gence functionaries are harassed, it is not astonishing to discover that
the more aggregative and future-oriented dimensions of the intelligence
tasks have been neglected.
The more general conditions affecting the constitutive intelligence
function represent a pattern of interacting factors, both predispositional
and environmental. Each of these requires brief development.
Predispositional
The most striking change is found in enhanced demands for in-
telligence, which have reached a new level of intensity, and in increased
acceptance of the relevance of intelligence. The overall effect of these
demands has been the creation of what may be described as a global
intelligence culture.
From the standpoint of an observer, every participant in social
process manifests a varying "intelligence utility." By this we mean
that in different contexts, a participant is capable of playing a role in
the intelligence function, drawing upon such idiosyncratic bases as his
social position, his sphere of activities, special skills or unique personal
experience. In a culture which is not particularly sensitive to the polit-
ical or other value effectiveness of intelligence, the concept of intelli-
gence utility may be appreciated best by especially conditioned sub-
sections of the comm~mity. Thus, in a pluralistic society, oppressed
minority groups will be particularly sensitized to the dangers of an
informer from within and will develop intensely held doctrines,
formulas and miranda to deter informers and to authorize harsh pre-
ventive and punitive sanctions by the group against actual or potential
informers. In such circumstances, the minority group is obsessed with
the reciprocal dependence of each member of the group on the other
members for the most minimum security; there is a high awareness of
negative intelligence utility. In the underworld intelligence utility is
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treated more ambivalently because it is found in a considerably more
cross-pressured setting. The informer is despised as a threat to indi-
vidual and group security and is subjected to an authorized code of
intense sanctions, including popular vilification. On the other hand,
intelligence utility has many positive aspects: the necessity for reliable
intelligence in a successful operation is well appreciated. Insider
knowledge is essential to certain operations, such as blackmail, and the
criminal's primary base of power is intelligence utility. A comparable
ambivalence is found in the police sub-culture; some manuals of police
investigation specify in detail the intelligence utility of different indi-
viduals in different contexts, including an estimate of the tactics that
will elicit the information needed. Often the tactics are in the "gray
zone" of law enforcement in which ordinarily immoral and illegal means
are employed.
Where entire segments of the population of more inclusive groups
habitually consider their intelligence utility vis-a.-vis official and/or
effective processes, we may speak of the emergence of an intelligence
sub-culture. In a city such as Paris, for example, where the police re-
putedly rely upon a vast group of informers spread through the hotel,
restaurant and entertainment industries, every concierge and ultimately
every individual privy to some aspect of the lives of another may con-
sider himself in terms of his intelligence utility. In any interactive
group, of course, an observer will have no difficulty in assessing the
intelligence utility of each individual. But so long as shared per-
spectives of group members and in particular persistent ethical notions
of privacy and respect for the integrity of each group member tend to
obstruct the perception (conscious gathering and processing) of details
about others, the total aggregate is not permeable to outside sur-
veillance.
Most indicators point to a trend toward a universal participation
in the shaping and sharing of enlightenment, hence, in the intelligence
function. Although waves of popular anti-intellectualism continue,
knowledge is increasingly viewed as a desirable commodity, alternately
a crucial base and scope value. Perhaps equally significant, the con-
ventional processes in which knowledge is thought to be acquired are
viewed as increasingly accessible to all people. Statistical series show
that more people are involved in the production and distribution of
knowledge than heretofore and trend projections indicate continued
growth of personnel in this sector. 110 In studies about knowledge, it is
significant that the economic view of knowledge as an independent
exogenous factor has been superseded by the notion of knowledge
110. F. MACHLUP, supra note 10, at 377-400.
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as an endogenous variable dependent upon the allocation of resources
within a cultural frameyl In terms of our basic social process model,
the enlightenment value-institution sector is more fully perceived as
among the major components of decision-making in the world
community.
The convergence of technology and political crisis has acted, on
the level of personal consciousness, to accelerate the diffusion of par-
ticipation in the intelligence phase of every value-institution area.
Technological innovations have made it increasingly easier to spy on
others in their business and personal activitiesY2 The popularization
of these techniques in the media has made notions of intelligence
utility personal and real to each individual. At the same time, global
political crisis has subjected the general population to experiences which
were formerly the exclusive property of a few. There are rough
parallels between the security crises of the 1950's in the United States
and the Stalinist period in the U.S.S.R. In the United States, loyalty
traumae lead to inclusive toleration by the general community of the
destruction of life careers on the grounds of faulty and at times
fantasied evidence in procedures diverging from authoritative standards.
In the U.S.S.R. every individual was expected to be an informant for
the state; the child who informed on his parents was held up as an
official example of appropriate inclusive devotion.
A coordinate predispositional development has been the rapid in-
crease in differentiated identifications. There are more and more
groups in the world and each of them seeks intelligence as a means of
maximizing its own preferred values. At the same time, the facts of
interdependence have emphasized that the most mundane behavior de-
pends upon knowing a great deal about others. A trend toward the
sharing of intelligence is countered by impulses to withhold intelligence
findings from non-group members.
Environmental
Most of the environmental conditions affecting the global intelli-
gence process have been mentioned or implied above: the technological
revolution, the fractionalized division of labor and the increased ap-
portionment of manpower and facilities to intelligence activities.
Crisis, as we have seen, is a major factor affecting the global in-
telligence process. From the standpoint of an objective observer, an
111. See F. MACHLUP, supra note 10, at 13-43.
112. See R. GREENE, supra note 10; A. WESTIN, SIIpra note 86.
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appropriate inclusive policy about crisis is one which is aimed at either
dissipating crisis or, where this is not possible, checking it in such
manner that it does not increase in intensity. To a participant, a crisis
is indicative of a breakdown in collaborative patterns. To an observer
in contrast, crisis may be perceived as evidence of more intense col-
laboration. Crisis, even when it is a reflexive state of mind in only one
participant, is interactive in the sense that it requires the image of at
least two participants. It may be considered an act of intense inter-
relationship in that the other, though depicted as hostile, is raised to a
new level of prominence in the crisis-ridden personality.
In certain circumstances, deprivations of intelligence, superficially
appearing as automatic response to crisis, may be viewed scientifically
as an inclusive preferred policy of coping with crises. If, for example,
the deprivation of intelligence, whether unilateral or reciprocal, will
predictably minimize a participant's resort to intense coercion, re-
strictions on intelligence gathering would represent prescription' with a
sound policy basis. The requisite circumstances would be such that
the unavailability of information as to the adversary's capabilities and
intentions would markedly increase the risks involved in unilateral
coercive action. However, in circumstances in which the absence of
intelligence regarding an adversary's capabilities and intentions would
increase the risks in not undertaking unilateral coercive action, inclusive
policy should clearly favor prescriptions facilitating the interchange of
intelligence. Similar contextual analysis can be applied to any of the
other characteristics composing the syndrome of crisis response. The
point is that rational policy and prescription are not a rationalizing
correlation of instinctive responses to crisis but rather the invention of
different strategies aimed at realizing basic policy in widely varying
contexts.
The policy about crisis most in accord with inclusive common in-
terests is one facilitating the reciprocal collection of intelligence for secu-
rity purposes. The international security system is not one supported
by effective hierarchical institutions. Security rests, if somewhat un-
certainly, upon a system of reciprocal deterrences, which are pre-
cariously institutionalized through threats of retaliation and promises
of reciprocity. The nuclear powers have achieved a capacity to de-
stroy each other. The most serious threat to the balance does not
reside in the possibility that one side will perceive a strategic gain by
a first strike, since all projections have negated this outcome. The
danger lies rather in the possibility that one side may misread the
capabilities and intentions of the other and, hence, come to believe that
its options have been narrowed to striking first or being struck first.
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While this functional system is not one to provide individuals with
a high degree of personal security, it has, so far, avoided a nuclear
catastrophe. It requires no imagination to point up the weaknesses of
a balance of terror system and its essential absurdity in terms of the
cost-gain ratio for achieving a stalemate. Yet there is no gainsaying
the realist who emphasizes the mutual distrust of nuclear powers and,
hence, their inability to back away from a precipice of their own
creation. Accordingly, creative efforts have been aimed at stabilizing
the balance of terror and preventing it from spiraling further. Since,
for example, the technological capacities of the nuclear giants are
roughly equal, any major weapons or defense improvements or in-
novations by one side will predictably be developed by the other, can-
celling out any unilateral strategic benefits. As a result, informed
appraisers argued against American development of an extensive ABM
system, both because it would be neutralized in the long run by a com-
parable Soviet response and it would destabilize the balance in the
short run.113 A strategic decision such as this is obviously devoid
of all utility if it is not fed immediately into the adversary's intelligence
system.
Inclusive international endeavors in the field of global security
have based themselves upon the reality of a balance of terror system.
Intensive effort has been directed at improving the international climate
by extending patterns of collaboration to the point where strong per-
ceptions of inextricable interdependence and the necessity for trust will
supplant the prevalent suspicion. The potentialities of genuine dis-
armament increase proportionately with the level of interidentification
and trust. Such activities do portend a feasible key to dissolving the
impasse, but their realization is obviously a distant goal. The complex
of subjectivities comprising the syndrome of parochialism is intensely
held and appears to be strengthened in periods of crisis to group integ-
rity or independence. Hence, at the operational level, organized inter-
national activities have sought to attenuate as much as possible areas
of possible clash between nuclear powers. The doctrine of preventive
diplomacy attributed to the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
meant in essence rushing the United Nations into a regional or local
crisis before a power vacuum drew the giants in.114 Clearly, this policy
reflects the interests of all nation-states threatened by the effects of
atomic Armageddon.
113. See A. CHAVES & ]. WIESNER, ABM: AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION
TO DEPLOY AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM (1969).
114. See, e.g., 12 U.N. GAOR, 12th Session, 690th Plenary meeting, paras. 72-73
(1957); 13 U.N. SCOR, 837th meeting, paras. 10-16 (1958). See also Schachter,
The Relatio,~ of Law, Politics and Actioll i,~ tlte United Nations, 1 HAGUE REcUEIL
200 (1963).
HeinOnline -- 46 Temp. L.Q. 434 1972-1973
434 TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46
The key to the contemporary global security system is a reliable
and unremitting flow of intelligence to the pinnacle elites of the nuclear
powers. The tension between this inclusive demand and the normal
crisis response of the attenuation of intelligence sharing is largely re-
sponsible for the bewilderment surrounding the legal aspects of intelli-
gence gathering operations. While nation-states have continued to
enforce national espionage statutes with vigor and on occasion to gen-
erate political power from asserted dangers of the enemy within, they
have become increasingly candid about their own intelligence gathering
activities. It is no longer surprising to find a national elite laying claim
to one of its captured operatives and participating openly in bartering
arrangements for his release. Such practices cannot, it is clear, be
interpreted as condonations of the penetration of the territorial integrity
of a state or as initial equivocations regarding the validity of national
espionage laws. But these practices are significant as indicators of new
perspectives, at least at the elite and sub-elite levels, regarding the col-
lection of security intelligence. Further evidence of this trend, if it is
necessary, can be found in the high tolerance level which has been
achieved in regard to legation based espionage activities operating under
the mantle of diplomatic immunity.
The fierce jealousy of national elites over their territorial integrity
has tended to obscure the vigor of this trend. The willingness to share
is sharpened as one moves from territorial limits to shared inter-
national resources. The air and space, for example, can serve as
critical instruments for intelligence gathering. Claims of sovereignty
over air space are generally recognized, though their diffusion in-
creases proportionately with their elevation. Yet President Eisenhower
enunciated an open skies policy for purposes of passive intelligence
gathering and his pronouncement has become, for the most part, ac-
cepted international lawY5 These examples are considered here as in-
dications of radically new and, for the most part, sound authoritative
international policies in regard to the collection of security intelligence.
IV. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
The purpose of the projective task, as noted earlier, is not to sug-
gest or insist upon the inevitability of some particular model of the
future. We make no claims to powers of neo-prophecy. By con-
templating a range of alternative futures, observers may, however, be-
come more capable of relating the significance and contribution of
contemporary behavior to the realization of one or another of the range
115. See note 52 supra.
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of desired futures.1l6 We may thus increase the possibility of choosing
current options which will most probably optimalize our goals in the
future. This operation does not involve "creating" the future,117 but
rather projecting a spectrum of futures from which a flow of imagina-
tive feedback increases the rationality of our own purposive behavior.
The technique of the developmental construct facilitates the pro-
jection of a range of complex futures. We consider two extremes: the
most pessimistic projection and the most optimistic. The optimistic
model must obviously involve a fleshing out of the more general policies
developed at the outset of this chapter, a depiction of the optimal global
intelligence function in a world order of human dignity. The pessi-
mistic model, in contrast, depicts the utter failure of these policies.
No matter how inevitable this latter construct may seem at this point
in time, it need not occasion a paralysis of gloom; rather it should be
taken as a challenge to alternative thinking. The extrapolation of a
complex present into the future may permit appraisal of the credibility
of each of these constructs, as well as of a variety of other potentialities
lying between these two extremes.
Excluding the annihilation of our species, the more pessimistic
construct of a future world order is that of "the garrison state," in
which social order is thoroughly militarized and bureaucratized and in
which knowledge is centralized to further increase the power of the
eliteYs The projection of such a garrison state, of course, represents
the greatest deviation from our overall goal of a world order of human
dignity, in which, in particular, power is shared. The more specific
effects upon the instrumental goals of an optimal intelligence function
can be examined systematically. This requires the testing of outcomes
against the postulated criteria of comprehensiveness, dependability,
selectivity, creativity and availability.
Comprehensiveness of focus in a garrison state construct will suffer
in a number of ways. Because intelligence will be husbanded as a base
of political power, large numbers of participants will be consciously
excluded from sharing in intelligence. Yet one crucial component of
116. For a thoughtful comparative discussion of conceptions and methods of
projection in the intelligence function, see K. KNORR & O. MORGENSTERN, supra note
63, at 3-35.
117. One notes, in this respect a striking symmetry between future-thinking and
past-thinking and, in many instances, the easy interchangeability of the activities.
Primitive myth-making and its contemporary historiography were often disguised
future-thinking and were almost always future-oriented. In cultures in which time
conceptions are cyclical or circular rather than linear, there is obviously no difference
between the two activities.
118. Lasswell, Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State VerslIs the Civilian
State, 2 CHINA Q. 643-49 (1937); H. LASSWELL, The Garrison State and Specialists
01J Violence, in THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 146 (1947).
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social knowledge is the combined experience of each inimitably unique
individual. In this respect, optimally comprehensive intelligence is an
intelligence process in which participation is maximally shared. By its
very dynamic of restriction of participation in intelligence, the garrison
state attenuates the focus and hence the ultimate effectiveness of its
intelligence function. Garrison statehood disseminates knowledge on
the basis of "need to know," a suitably ambiguous formula whose con-
tent reflects the shifting power of elites. The result is that plenary
intelligence is never made available, either to intelligence specialists or
to those charged with the execution of other decision functions. In
particular, new technical innovations which are deemed to have power
potential will be kept secret. The cognitive maps with which each indi-
vidual is expected to operate are not as comprehensive as they might be
and all decision functions suffer. Comprehensiveness will also suffer
in the garrison state because the resources needed for exploration and
investigation of the plenary range of value concerns of the community
will be concentrated, instead, in those sectors promising a high power
return for incumbent elites. In most cases in the past, this has in-
volved intensive research in the instruments of destruction rather than
production.
Dependability suffers equally in the garrison state projection. The
reduction of intelligence to a patent base of political power politicizes
every participant in the intelligence process. Hence the communica-
tions of scientists will increasingly reflect concern for their own posi-
tions rather than for the truth. This type of "Lysenkoism" does not
exhaust its perniciousness in immediate political communication. In-
sofar as intelligence continues to retain some premium within the entire
social process, information which is purposely falsified, suppressed or
distorted affects behavior, through time, in all sectors. The low de-
pendability of intelligence will warp the performance of every decision
function, for the products of the intelligence process are of paramount
importance in each.
Selectivity, it will be recalled, is a preferred process of constantly
shifting and reappraising the use of limited resources in relation to
those areas most crucial in the comprehensive intelligence map. As
such, selectivity is intensely responsive to the goals of those elites
charged with selection. From the standpoint of the observer, optimum
selectivity involves the use of resources in a way best designed to
maintain a world public order of human dignity and, in particular, to
sustain the efficacy of appropriate decision processes. The greatest and
most persistent deviation from this goal recurs in the garrison state.
Resources are allocated in accord with the purposes of specialized elites
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and not in accord with community objectives. Little relevance is
attached to common interests.
There is abundant evidence for the fact that creativity in the in-
telligence function suffers enormously in a garrison state.119 The
cognitive map of intelligence specialists is constricted, foci of attention
are determined by elite interests, and the politicization of the entire
process makes individual survival more probable if investigators follow
the safe, conventional and well-worn path rather than jeopardize them-
selves in new ventures of creativity. Beyond this, the experience of
intelligence participants attests to the need for openness as a condition
requisite to creativity: an effort at constriction of creativity results in
a restriction of creativity.
The availability of intelligence to a wide range of participants
suffers in a garrison state. It is obvious that information is made
available to the rank-and-file only insofar as such dissemination furthers
the aims of the effective elites of the garrison state. Even among
elites themselves, ready availability of information decreases because
information, as a base of power, is guarded and not shared freely with
those momentarily charged with decision responsibility.
Hence, it is clear that a dominating feature of a garrison state
world construct, viewed against the goals of a preferred world public
order and of the specific instrumental policies of the intelligence func-
tion, must be a regressive intelligence function. Such a crippled
function will contribute far less than required for the rational perform-
ance of other particular decision functions and, as a result, lower even
further the rationality of aggregate decision processes. That such a
construct produces irrational decisions, should not, however, be viewed
as of itself a dynamic for systemic self-improvement; the motive force
of a garrison state is not the common interest, comprehensively under-
stood, but the special interests of ascendant elites and mid-elites. As
long as these special interests are realized, the intelligence function and
all other functions are viewed by effective participants as adequately
acquitting themselves of their obligations. While the observer may
consider these and other decisions as bizarre, effective participants may
not. In the recent past, changes in public order (as opposed to changes
in elite personnel of garrison states) have come from without.12o
An entirely different construct projects the intelligence function in
a world public order of human dignity. In such a construct, values
are widely shared and intelligence is regularly mobilized to clarify and
aid in the implementation of common interests. The instrumental
119. E. SHILS, supra note 15, at 176-91; S. KENT, supra note 3, at 174-75.
120. BlIt see C. FRIEDRICH & Z. BRZEZINSKI, slIpra note 3.
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policies which we have considered earlier would of course fare better in
this projection.
A wider sharing of knowledge would lead directly to a more
comprehensive focus for the intelligence function, for it would be com-
prised of the social reality of every individual of the world community.
At the same time, unrestricted dissemination would permit each indi-
dividual to expand and update his own cognitive map of reality and, as
a result, increase the comprehensiveness of his own contribution to the
intelligence process. Comprehensiveness will be further increased by
broader and more effective education. This development will be ac-
companied on the institutional and transnational level by the prolifera-
tion of governmental and non-governmental organizations specialized
to knowledge.
Dependability of the products of the intelligence function would
also increase in a construct of a public order of human dignity. The
general openness which would characterize the intelligence function
would make communications more honest and more subject to
verification.
Selectivity and relevance would be governed by the continuing
concern to clarify common interests and to allocate intelligence re-
sources which would most facilitate the ongoing realization of such
interests. Greater interdependence would both increase the production
of knowledge as well as the utilization of knowledge. At the same time,
plenary participation by all in the function would assure a selectivity
responsive to common interests.
We have observed that creativity in the performance of intelligence
function tasks is lowered in restrictive and intensively controlled en-
vironments. The converse-that creativity flourishes in a public order
of human dignity-eannot be inevitably foretold. On the other hand,
there is ample data to suggest that creative activity requires the freedom
for participants to formulate their own cognitive map and calculus of
mqUIry.
The positive and negative constructs we have essayed involve
integral sets of conditions which cannot be treated here in systematic
detail. The conditioning factors which attend the garrison state con-
struct may be strong enough to sustain that trend. The comparatively
poor intelligence performance of the garrison state (in terms of the
internal rationality of the process under consideration as well as in
terms of the preferred goals of the observer) does not, as we have
emphasized, mean that garrison state elites themselves will initiate
changes toward a more open public order system. The garrison state
is an instrument for the accomplishment of the special interests of its
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elites and rationality is defined exclusively in those narrow terms. Nor
can intelligence specialists themselves be expected to initiate changes,
even though the garrison state which they serve is the antithesis of the
myth system of their own skill group: Garrison statehood means con-
tinued dependence by knowledge specialists for support of their activities
upon the power elites themselves. At the same time, skill group sup-
port for those members sharing common perspectives may be expected
to further erode the quality of the intelligence process. The special
interests of the intelligence group will impel members to give credibility
to their confreres on the basis of common identity rather than on
grounds of veracity.
The constellation of conditioning factors attending the more
positive construct of future world order may also tend to sustain such
a trend. One result of general openness is that an increased number
of base values will be available for intelligence products from sources
other than power factors. Hence more specialists of knowledge will
change their personal goals and such changes will be accelerated by the
comparative ease of access to technology and knowledge. A further
feature of this cluster of factors will be the increased capital investment
available for the production of specific and sophisticated knowledge.
The technique of the construct involves systematic and disciplined
imagination of the future in order to set contemporary options and their
value significance over time into the highest relief possible. The ob-
server may, as well, essay shorter-term conceptions of the future based
on limited extrapolations of trends and conditions. From our prior
analysis of the intelligence function, six major trends appear to be
sufficiently strong to sustain themselves in the short-term future and, in
turn, to maintain and engender further effects. Briefly stated, they
are as follows:
1. There will continue to be an increase in all knowledge.
2. The existing geographical inequalities in intelligence capabilities
and performances will continue. Where intelligence is already recog-
nized as a function of crucial importance, it will become more important,
even as it is upgraded in currently underdeveloped areas.
3. The technological capacity of intelligence to reach and inform
every individual on the globe has been limited in the past by a com-
parable technology of increasingly efficacious non-disclosure and/or
fabrication of false information. Many of the inadequacies of global
intelligence in the past can be traced to this dialectical stalemate of
technologies of permeation and of non-disclosure. We may expect this
process to continue.
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4. The trend toward non-disclosure and fabrication may, however,
be deflected at a later point in time by increasing demands by people
for access to vital information. Such demands are a source of dis-
affection in the current world arena and should they accelerate, they
may precipitate a major change in world political order and, deriva-
tively, radical changes in the allocation of intelligence about the globe.
5. Projected limitations on unimpeded access to comprehensive
intelligence flows may have large scale detrimental effects on human
creativity in the future. Because creativity is a function of access to the
entire context, any limitation of such access will impede creativity.
6. Future increases in the availability of intelligence either within
component communities or in the entire global community may well
have an effect contrary to that which was intended, if certain prepara-
tions are not made. Thus, a sudden increase in intelligence may cause
a systems or load breakdown on administrative levels, until provisions
are made for handling the increased quantities. On the personal level,
gross increases in intelligence may cause enormous discontent and dis-
affection or privitization and withdrawal from political processes.121
One indication of such a trend, which is already evident in a number
of civilizations in which intelligence is comparatively freely shared, is
the deflection of creativity toward the expressive, the emergence of
patterns of stylized art, and the creation through esthetics of private
worlds.
V. ALTERNA TlVES
Positive and negative constructs of the future are developed only
to spotlight opportunities for creative intervention. We consider a few
such alternatives systematically in the framework of phase analysis of
the intelligence function.
Participants
One important opportunity is to direct effort toward increasing
the organized inclusiveness of the intelligence function on a global
scale. It is now perceived how urgently this is needed for the mainte-
nance of "security" in the broadest sense, including both protection
against military attack and the conservation of the environmental re-
sources upon which all values depend. Its urgency is no less for every
other facet of global social process. The world constitutive process re-
quires, on the international governmental level, new global and regional
121. C. WRIGHT, MASS COMMUNICATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 11-20
(1959).
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machinery with facilities and resources adequate for the comprehensive
and dependable gathering, processing and dissemination of information
relevant to constitutive and public order decisions. The products of
such an "Intelligence International" or "Global Knowledge Center"
should be made freely and widely available to people everywhere.
The intelligence functions of extant organizations should, at the
same time, be strengthened. Organizations such as the United Nations
Secretariat, the organs of the General Assembly, the ILO, the FAO,
UNESCO, WHO, WMO, IMCO, IAEA, ICAO and so on, already
comprise a world intelligence grid which could be improved to play
a more effective role.
Comparable efforts need to be taken on the national and local level.
Adequate global intelligence is dependent upon contributions from
every region and locality. Few even of the most mature national
communities have developed adequate structures for intelligence and
planning.
At the same time, there should be full development of a range of
effective intelligence facilities in the civic order as a means of in-
creasing the comprehensiveness of focus and participation, as well as
for preventing any monopolization of the intelligence function. Any
consideration of the intelligence resources of a community should, thus,
include such private· associations as professional groups and research
institutes.
Each of these recommendations is designed to increase participa-
tion and to deter the formation of functional monopolies of either the
gathering, processing or dissemination of knowledge. The realization
of these preferences can be further facilitated by initially severely
limiting, and in the degree possible ultimately abolishing, secrecy.
Instrumental policies such as "open skies" and "open seas" for the
gathering of intelligence should thus be maintained, particularly for
international agencies.
Perspectives
The best contribution of the intelligence function will not be in
"neutral" intelligence products in specific value areas. It will rather
be in the effectiveness of an entire global process committed to the
realization of human dignity. In this respect, the perspectives of all
who are involved in the sequences of intelligence activities are ex-
ceedingly important. It is urgent that those involved in the intelligence
function achieve a measure of world identity with the corresponding
demands and expectations. These identification patterns can be estab-
lished and sustained by training, and this is a function for which the
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contemporary media are optimally suited. Numerous other promotional
techniques are available to develop such identities, all of which can give
premium emphasis to the most inclusive symbols.
The cognitive map upon which are based the matter of fact ex-
pectations about the past and the future is as crucial for groups as for
individuals in the performance of the intelligence function. It is be-
coming increasingly apparent that constricted cognitive maps are in
great part the result of acculturation and maleducation. Accordingly a
range of programs should be developed to aid individuals in constantly
expanding their personal frames of inquiry; at the same time, there
should be a regular cross cultural appraisal of the comprehensiveness
of the cognitive abacus of entire cultures.
Arenas
The effectiveness for an order of human dignity of the expanded
intelligence organizations which we have recommended will be, in no
small part, dependent upon freedom of access to such organizations and
the availability of their products. Everyone in the world should have
an opportunity to be part of the intelligence process regarding decisions
affecting their lives. Such participation will involve not only the more
obvious changes in political institutions about the globe, but equally
radical changes in primary and secondary education; it is in these
sequences that the capacity to play meaningful roles in intelligence as
in all other functions can be decisively imprinted.
The effectiveness of arenas of intelligence depends not only on
unrestricted access, but also on a degree of compulsoriness in the
acquisition of information sufficient to bring to the focus of attention of
intelligence specialists the data necessary to make rational decisions
about matters of inclusive interest. Where intelligence has been em-
ployed as an instrument of power elites, a high degree of compulsory
power has always been available and has frequently been abused.
Where intelligence has operated in civic order settings, in contrast, a
sufficient compulsoriness has not attended intelligence gathering. The
need for compulsoriness varies with context; in an order of human
dignity in which there is clear perception of and intense identification
with the common interest, voluntary action will often supersede the
need for compulsory action. In public orders which diverge from such
a preferred model or in orders which are moving toward a preferred
model, the degree of compulsoriness will thus be inversely proportional
to the deviation from a structured system of human dignity. In these
circumstances, choices about the uses of coercion for intelligence gather-
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ing will have to be made. Orienting frameworks and policy recom-
mendations for lawful coercion have been developed elsewhere.122
Base Values
The authority provided for an effective intelligence function
should be sufficient to protect the recommended features of that func-
tion. Authority should approximate the assets needed to keep knowl-
edge expanding at a high rate.
Because intelligence is itself a crucial base for further intelligence,
monopolies of information must be forbidden. There must be a strong
demand for the sharing of enlightenment, and skill and power must not
be used to restrict this diffusion. This is an alternative which can be
pursued on both the national and international levels. National
agencies, by virtue of their territorial competence, may require inter-
national cartels to divest monopolized information as part of the price
for pursuing values within the territorial jurisdiction of the state con-
cerned. International decision processes may forward a similar de-
mand. Governmental agencies on the national and international level
may themselves be required to pursue a policy of maximum disclosure.
A functional check on intelligence monopoly can be provided in a
system of multiple sources of information, such that no single intelli-
gence unit can acquire an effective monopoly of information: coarchical
groups may acquire the same knowledge and divulge it. The en-
couragement of multiple sources involves incentives for the establish-
ment of intelligence production units in both the public and the civic
order, in official processes as well as in private institutes, and in the
dispersion of intelligence producers in all public order systems and in
all regions about the globe.
Checks on information monopolies may be further facilitated by
the establishment of world networks of scientific laboratories and uni-
versities controlled by international organizations. The inclusive char-
acter of the global intelligence function may be further extended by
expanding the role of the United Nations and other international
organizations.
Inclusive control over the dissemination of education, knowledge
and skill can be further consolidated by viewing all media as public
utilities. Authoritative action to accomplish this has been recommended
in a number of states, but there has been a tendency to confuse prob-
lems of ownership with those of effective supervision. It is the latter
122. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 54; W. REISMAN, supra note 24,
at ch. 18.
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which is crucial and which must be secured, even where there is effec-
tive public control of media.
Strategies
Any grand design for improvement of the intelligence function will
adapt the gathering, processing and dissemination of information to the
five distinguishing dimensions of problem-solving in the decision
process. The first requirement is to assume the overriding goals to be
sought through constitutive and public order decisions. The second
requirement is to obtain the factual data that show the degree to which
these goals have been realized, or failed of realization, in trends to
the present time. The third requirement is to identify the sources for
obtaining the most dependable scientific interpretations of the direction
and magnitude of these tendencies. The fourth task is the projection
of alternative versions of probable future developments. Finally comes
the consideration of immediate policy objectives. Account must be
taken of the probable course of future development and the costs, gains
and risks of alternative sequences of policy action. Since the demands
of decisionmakers for intelligence are often of great urgency, procedures
must be available on a standby basis to reach all relevant sources
promptly. Secrecy barriers are especially important in crises, since
judgments based on rumor, deception and half-truth are unsatisfactory
guides to action.
To the degree that the world arena remains divided and latently
hostile, the individual nation-states will adopt strategies intended to
protect their own security secrets and discover the corresponding secrets
of potential enemies. In developing periods of crisis these double func-
tions absorb the capacities of specialized intelligence services. The
ultimate confrontation occurs when elite A decides to mount a surprise
attack on B. The principles of successful deception can be studied to
advantage in such cases as the Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese, the
massive assault on Russia by the Germans, and the Allied invasion of
Europe in World War II. The future protection of a more satis-
factory world order will presumably dispense with surprise attacks
save in circumscribed police raids; it would be foolhardy to assume
that the element of surprise will be dispensed with entirely in the im-
mediate future. The task of intelligence services that protect incipient
world order will be to guard against surprise. Consequently, it will be
important to analyze cases of successful deception for the purpose of
improving the strategies of discovery. The conditions of surprise
attack must be understood if surprises are to be unmasked.
HeinOnline -- 46 Temp. L.Q. 445 1972-1973
1973] THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 445
Roberta Wohlstetter's analysis of Pearl Harbor emphasizes the
ambiguity of authentic warning signals as the main explanation of
surprise.123 The "noise," including the deceptive information that sur-
rounds the authentic signals, is said to contribute to this ambiguity.
Barton Whalley's study of the German invasion of Russia presents a
different analysis. He argues that "the purpose of disinformation is to
reduce ambiguity, confusion, and uncertainty by making its victim more
certain and wrong." 124 Hitler succeeded in convincing Stalin that he
would invade Britain before turning East, and that he would, at most,
use the huge German forces along the Russian frontier to issue an
ultimatum that Stalin could afford to accept. Stalin believed that he
needed to buy another year of preparation before he could fight Hitler.
It would be a great boon to world security if espionage were
rendered obsolete and if, as a step in this direction, more espionage
services were to pool their information, especially when weapons or
planned violations of public order are involved. The cultivation of
cross-boundary contacts among scholars, scientists, and officials is a
long-term means of diminishing the probability that secrecy can be
maintained. World public order requires openness; and strategies of
openness include the supplementation of official channels by structures
under civic control, or run by official agencies not closely aligned with
superpower or great power coalitions.
Intelligence activities utilize aptitudes of many kinds. Projecting
the future appeals to independent and imaginative individuals who are
disciplined, though not overawed, by the results of formal extrapola-
tions of trend, or by summaries of scientific results. Similarly, creative
innovators of policy projects often differ from systematizing scientists
or meticulous historians. To an increasing extent relatively developed
societies are concerned with specialists on the policy process itself who
use deliberately iconoclastic approaches to stimulate the invention of
new policies.
Another characteristic of developed societies where popular gov-
ernment prevails is general participation. This means that in many
communities the experts, public officials and citizens from every social
stratum work together.
Intelligence agencies are most broadly connected with the public
when the task is to disseminate. processed information to the com-
munity at large. The recipients will often continue to be severely
restricted in number so long as war or threat of war continues, and
security requirements include the tactics of secrecy and deception.
123. See note 69 supra.
124. B. WHALLEY, THE BARBAROSSA CODE 224 (1973).
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As more people identify themselves with the welfare of the world
community as a whole, the tensions surrounding secrecy will become
more severe. Competent scientists and scholars will feel justified in
violating "unreasonable" secrecy regulations made by nation-states.
Presumably the tactics on behalf of secrecy will become more stringent
under these conditions, and the conflicts will multiply. Professionally
trained persons will become more acutely conscious of the latent contra-
dictions between client-serving and citizen-participation in the world
community.
The scientists of society know that a key question for the future
is whether or not the spectacularly changing technology of knowledge,
and especially knowledge of society, will be in the hands of a limited
class or caste that serves its own interest. The alternative is to share
the control of information widely among territorial and pluralistic
groups. Unless they are able to obtain access to comprehensive stocks
of information, individuals and groups will be blind judges of public
policy. Their protests can be dismissed as the fruit of ignorance and
bias. Lacking access, critics will be unable to develop realistic alterna-
tives to policies sustained by governmental or private monopolies of
knowledge. If we concede that "knowledge is power," popular govern-
ment requires that access to information must be prompt and total.
Computer technology supplies the means of storing, processing and
distributing the information required for realistic judgments to be
made on policy questions. Part of the problem is to authorize effective
access, while at the same time protecting legitimate claims to privacy.
The computer is enormously important because, in principle, it can
provide everyone with prompt access to a concise and selective "map of
the whole." Every phase of any process of value shaping and sharing
can be made apparent to anyone who is active at any point within it.
In a corporate enterprise this applies from the highest executive to the
humblest laborer.
The availability of the new intelligence instruments emphasizes
two politically crucial points: one, the importance of obtaining tech-
nically competent advice for the guidance of laymen; two, the changing
content of education. In developed societies it is customary for every
interest group, when it becomes aware of itself, to obtain legal and
other forms of technical assistance. If general participation is to be-
come more effective it will be necessary to provide educational oppor-
tunities that acquaint everyone with the fundamental map of the world.
It is not a question of mastering detail-which is an expert's task-
but of comprehending the political, economic and other contours of the
globe. The problem is to focus attention on the salient features of past,
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present and future events. The population at large can share a com-
mon map with the specialist, and live in a context that he feels at home
with. It is alleged that some tribal societies were able to provide an
inclusive map for their members. The current challenge is to achieve
the equivalent result on a world scale. Several innovations have been
proposed to aid in the accomplishment of this purpose, among which we
mention continuing seminars and the social planetarium.
VI. CONCLUSION
Basic to any body politic is the realism of the judgments that enter
into the stream of public decision. Fundamental to judgment is intelli-
gence which is the gathering, processing and dissemination of problem-
identifying and problem-solving information. The five intellectual tasks
are the clarification of goals, the description of trends, the analysis of
conditions, the projection of developments, and the formulation of
policy alternatives. The intelligence process is responsible for locating
all sources of knowledge that may be useful to decisionmakers, and for
the mobilization of the information relevant to questions of immediate
importance.
In a more interdependent world special interests will find them-
selves under informed attack. They can be expected to resist the
dissemination of intelligence that may be used to undermine their
position. Crucial to the outcome will be the willingness of men of
knowledge to identify with the common goals of world public order and
to strengthen civic initiatives that support a public order compatible
with the dignity of man.
The development of an adequate intelligence function calls for co-
operation among official and private agencies. The model of Interpol
may be simulated by "Interspy," a service that draws upon the sources
available to all organizations willing and able to work together to ex-
pose threats to world public order. Computer technology can be em-
ployed to provide a dependable, and balanced picture of past, present and
future events. Authoritative and controlling arrangements are needed
to allow access to this picture by all territorial and pluralistic elements
in the world community. Educational practices must be transformed
in ways that familiarize the population with the world situation as a
whole, and with particular localities and sectors. Satellite systems
provide the channels required to achieve universal programs of educa-
tion, and to encourage alternative versions' of controversial matters.
Intelligence policies aim at raising and sustaining the quality of two
overlapping streams of information; one is primarily directed to the
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adult audience, the other is mainly aimed at the young. The function
of the latter is to cultivate predispositions that enable members of the
world audience to utilize information effectively, and to exert con-
tinuous pressure on public and civic organizations for the adequate
performance of the proper tasks of intelligence.
